












Title of Dissertation: DEMAND FOR SAFER FOOD IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES   
  
 Romina Valeria Ordonez, Doctor of Philosophy, 
2016 
  
Dissertation directed by: Professor Vivian E. Hoffmann 




According to the WHO, in less developed countries approximately 2.2 million 
people—most of whom are children—die annually of food and waterborne diseases. In 
these economies, information on the safety attributes of food is usually not available and 
enforcement of food safety regulations is often weak, particularly within markets for 
locally consumed food. Still, food safety in the developing world has long been 
considered a secondary concern relative to food availability. The goal of this dissertation 
is to contribute to a deeper understanding of some of the constraints that surround 
demand for safer food along food supply chains in developing countries. Consumers’ 
demand for safe food can be thought of as an investment in preventive health, which has 
been shown to be extremely low in developing countries. Hence, this dissertation 
contributes to the economics literature that explores the impact of health-related 
information on preventive health behaviors in poor countries. 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on the role of food safety information in affecting 
people’s purchase behavior in a developing country setting. Because food safety is 
mostly a credence attribute that cannot be ascertained—or is too costly to ascertain—
even after consumption, the provision of information has an important role to play in the 
reduction of information asymmetries inside the food chains. Among the several actors 
that are involved in food value chains, this dissertation focuses on small-scale informal 
intermediaries and consumers. The effect of information on these actors’ demand for 
safer food is assessed through the estimation of willingness to pay for food labeled as 
having safer characteristics, and through the analysis of the effect of different types of 
health-related information on the decision of whether or not to purchase food advertised 
as safer to eat. To achieve this, two field experiments using revealed preference methods 
were conducted in Kenya, where maize, the staple food, is frequently contaminated with 
aflatoxin, a naturally-occurring fungal toxin that is harmful to human health.   
A brief introductory chapter is followed by a comparison of the advancement of 
food safety policy and research in developed countries with the corresponding evolution 
in developing countries (Chapter 2).   
The framed field experiment described in Chapter 3 tests whether maize traders in 
informal markets are willing to pay more for higher quality and safer maize. 369 traders 
from different markets across Kenya participated in a second-price sealed-bid auction in 
which information on moisture content and aflatoxin contamination of maize auctioned 
was varied experimentally using labels. The results show that information on moisture 
content significantly affects traders’ willingness to pay and suggest the observability of 
moisture content is limited. Also, the effect of information does not appear to be driven 
 
 
by the possibility of selling drier maize to the formal sector, nor by the intention to keep 
the dryer maize for own family consumption. Further, the impact of providing traders 
with information on aflatoxin contamination is over twice as large as the effect of 
moisture content information. These results show that there is potential for strengthening 
the price-quality relationship within this context by increasing the availability of 
information on maize quality and safety.  
Chapter 4 presents the results of a field experiment conducted among customers of 
small retail shops in Nairobi and smaller urban centers in eastern Kenya. Packages of 
maize flour were tested for aflatoxin, labeled as safe to eat when they complied with the 
aflatoxin regulation, and offered for sale at a 20% premium above the price of untested 
maize. Information messages about the health consequences of aflatoxin exposure and 
about local contamination prevalence were randomly varied across customers as they 
entered the shops. The results show that the impact of health messaging on purchase of 
tested maize varies significantly depending both on the specific content of the message, 
and on the characteristics and prior beliefs of consumers. Information on the local 
prevalence of aflatoxin contamination, which exceeded the vast majority of customers’ 
contamination priors, had the strongest impact on demand. This study demonstrates that 
combining information on the prevalence of a risk with its health consequences is an 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In many developing areas of the world, consuming food can be much riskier than in 
developed economies. The limited access to technology and infrastructure that would 
make food production, storage, transportation and commercialization safer for human 
consumption makes food more prone to contamination. Also, a large portion of food 
consumed in the developing world comes from households’ own farm production, which 
is hard to regulate and monitor. Moreover, the lack of regulation governing the 
production and processing of food for local consumption and the weak enforcement of 
existing regulations contribute to worsening local food safety. Even when there is 
political will to enforce existing regulations, the lack of affordable technology and 
knowledge to enforce cost-effective regulations, makes it difficult for poor countries to 
accomplish the endeavor. As a result, unsafe food has a significant role in the large 
burden of disease borne by developing countries, and is therefore an important public 
health issue. For instance, in less developed countries, approximately 2.2 million 
people—most of whom are children—die annually of food and waterborne diseases, 
which are difficult to disentangle (WHO, 2002; Hoffmann, 2010).  
Therefore, improving food safety in developing countries is an urgent matter that 
would benefit from understanding what is the demand for safer food at every link in the 
food supply chains. Although research contributions related to food safety in developed 
economies can provide some guidance, strengthening food safety in poor countries 
requires a different approach from that followed in advanced economies. Food demand in 
developing countries is much more affected by budget constraints than in developed 
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countries, so consumers’ responses when faced with safer food alternatives in richer 
countries might differ a great deal from those of more income-constrained consumers in 
poor settings. Further, food safety comprises several unobservable or imperfectly 
observable characteristics, which can make it hard for consumers and other agents in the 
value chain to recognize the quality of the food they consume. This problem is 
exacerbated in developing countries due to the small-scale and informal nature of food 
production and markets, as well as their often weak regulatory environments. The 
absence of certifications and information labels in these settings leads to uninformed 
consumption choices that can have negative health consequences. To make matters 
worse, poor countries’ consumers are frequently unaware of these food-related health 
risks. This highlights the key role played by access to food safety and quality 
information.  
This dissertation focuses on the role of food safety information in affecting 
people’s purchase behavior in a developing country setting. In particular, I analyze the 
impact on demand of information related to: i) food characteristics directly linked to food 
safety (such as the absence of harmful toxins or moisture content); ii) risk prevalence; 
and iii) health consequences of eating unsafe food. Because food safety is mostly a 
credence attribute that cannot be ascertained—or is too costly to ascertain—even after 
consumption, the provision of information has an important role to play in the reduction 
of information asymmetries inside the food chains. Demand for safe food can be thought 
of as an investment in preventive health, which has been shown to be extremely low in 
developing countries. Further, there is evidence that households in poor countries are 
often unaware of the health risks they face and the cost of not knowing them, as well as 
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of the benefits of investing in preventive health behavior (Dupas, 2011b). Hence, this 
study contributes to the literature that explores the impact of health-related information 
on preventive health behaviors in poor country settings.  
Several lines of research have centered on the topic of valuation of food safety and 
other food quality characteristics. However, the majority of these studies have been 
conducted in developed countries. In contrast, the valuation of food safety related to 
products locally consumed in developing countries has been much less studied. One of 
the reasons for this is that food safety regulation has gone through more than a century of 
consistent progress in the industrialized world, whereas the development of food safety 
policy in developing countries is a relatively more recent phenomenon. Another reason is 
that food safety in the developing world has been considered for a long time a secondary 
concern relative to food availability. I begin this dissertation by comparing the 
advancement of food safety policy and research in developed countries with the 
corresponding evolution in developing countries in order to explore the reasons why food 
safety regulation in developing economies is lagging behind. In trying to answer this 
question, particular effort was put into trying to detect the different types of drivers that 
have led to policy changes in this field in the developed and developing areas of the 
world. This serves as a contextual framework and motivation for the main topic studied 
in this dissertation: the demand for safer food in developing countries.  
Among the several actors that are involved in the food value chains, this 
dissertation focuses on small informal intermediaries and consumers. The effect of 
information on demand is assessed through the estimation of willingness to pay for food 
labeled as having safer characteristics, and through the analysis of the effect of different 
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types of health-risk information on the decision whether or not to buy food advertised as 
safer to eat. To achieve this, two field experiments using revealed preference methods 
were conducted in Kenya, a Sub-Saharan country with high levels of staple food 
contamination with naturally-occurring toxins.  
Naturally occurring fungal toxins—mycotoxins—are one of the most serious food 
safety problems affecting staple crops, especially maize and groundnuts, in developing 
countries.
1
 Also, due to their influence on trade and livestock production, mycotoxins can 
have large economic impacts (Grace et al., 2015). Maize contamination with aflatoxins, 
the most potent type of mycotoxins and the most carcinogenic organic substances on 
earth, is the food safety issue chosen for this dissertation. Aflatoxins cause around 90,000 
cases of liver cancer annually and are strongly associated with immunosuppression and 
stunting in children (Grace et al., 2015). Aflatoxins are highly prevalent in many 
developing areas of the world, especially tropical and subtropical regions, and local 
populations are generally unaware of their health consequences. Hence, aflatoxin 
contamination of staple food is a serious threat for public health and development in poor 
countries with high aflatoxin contamination prevalence.  
Among the more than 40 crops that are prone to aflatoxin contamination, maize 
was selected for this dissertation because it is the most important staple food in many 
Sub-Saharan countries and it is one of the worst afflicted crops. Maize is the main staple 
                                                 
1
 The other broad categories of food contaminants are: i) pathogenic bacteria, viruses and 
parasites; and ii) chemical contaminants, such as agrochemical residues and environmental 
contaminants. The former have been thoroughly studied in developing country settings, and the 
latter, although not as much studied in these settings, are mostly considered an occupational 
hazard rather than a food safety one (Hoffmann, 2009). Hence, my dissertation focuses on the less 
studied food safety issues among the most relevant to developing countries.  
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food in Kenya, where this research is conducted.
 2
 In Kenya, high levels of aflatoxin 
contamination have been found in farmers’ maize stocks, in maize sold in informal 
markets and in processed packages of maize flour for sale at local shops. The fact that 
75% of Kenyan maize production is grown by smallholder farmers makes tracing 
contaminated maize and testing for aflatoxins extremely hard and costly, which 
aggravates the contamination problem in the country (Guantai and Seward, 2010).  
I conducted two field experiments that use aflatoxin-contaminated maize in Kenya 
as the setting to test the effect of certain types of food-related information on food 
demand. The first experiment (which I will call the “traders experiment”) estimates 
informal traders’ willingness to pay for maize grains with certain attributes—moisture 
content and aflatoxin contamination—through the use of auctions. This experiment aims 
to understand if incentives can be created inside the maize value chain in order to 
encourage the production of safer food and the safer handling of food before reaching 
consumers. The second experiment (which I will call the “consumers experiment”) 
intends to assess if there exists consumer demand for food labeled as safe to eat, and how 
it can be influenced through the provision of information relevant for consumers’ 
decision-making process. Both experiments use revealed preference methods to assess 
the impact of information on behavior. While the first experiment focuses on one link of 
the value chain, the second experiment focuses on another. 
Harrison and List (2004) developed a classification of field experiments that 
includes: artefactual field experiments; framed field experiments; and natural field 
                                                 
2
 Maize constitutes 36% of the daily caloric intake of the average Kenyan, and its annual per 
capita consumption rate is around 98 kilograms (Abele et al., 2006; FAOSTAT). Maize is also the 




experiments. The traders experiment fits clearly in the category of framed field 
experiment, as it consisted of having real maize traders in real open air markets reflecting 
on their valuation of maize bags of different qualities and submitting bids for them. Using 
Harrison and List (2004)’s terminology, I worked with a nonstandard subject pool, an 
imposed set of rules, and field context in the commodity (maize bags), task (purchasing 
maize bags) and information the subjects could use (maize characteristics, maize prices). 
Because traders knew that they were part of a research experiment, it cannot be 
considered a natural field experiment. The consumers experiment shares several 
characteristics with a natural field experiment because I worked with real shop customers 
in field context in the commodity, task and information they could use, and on top of this, 
there was no set of rules to follow and customers did not know that their purchase 
decisions would later be observed (though they were asked for consent to participate in a 
research study when first approached). Because people tend to exhibit stronger moralistic 
and pro-social behavior when they know they are being scrutinized (Levitt and List, 
2005), natural field experiments can help obtain truer valuations. 
Some of the questions that will be answered in the two chapters where I describe 
the experiments are the following: Are informal traders willing to pay more for maize 
labeled as having higher quality and being safer to eat? How valuable is this information 
for traders, given that they use their own simpler methods to assess maize quality? Are 
maize consumers willing to pay a premium for aflatoxin-safe labeled maize? Can certain 
types of information, such as contamination prevalence or health consequences of 
aflatoxin exposure, have a larger effect on consumers’ food purchase decisions? Does the 
effect of information depend on consumers’ characteristics?  
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If consumers are willing to pay a premium for safer food, the incentives of all other 
agents in the value chain could be aligned with the ultimate objective of producing safer 
food. Processors and traders in these settings might then be willing to also pay a premium 
for safer inputs and products. Further, when farmers are aware of the existence of a price 
premium for safer agricultural production, they can also have the incentive to use safer 
practices and inputs in their production. What is more, assessing willingness to pay is 
particularly important in settings—such as the one studied here—where institutional and 
government budget constraints are large and hence cost-sharing with the private sector 
can be a solution (Guiteras et al, 2015).  
Given the complexities of food production and sale in poor country settings, there 
is still a lack of agreement among the development community on how food safety 
problems should be tackled. What is undeniable is that improving food safety in these 
contexts requires understanding the constraints and incentives faced by all actors in the 
food value chain: farmers, processors, traders, regulatory agents, and consumers. The two 
experiments described in this dissertation aim to shed light on the incentives of some of 
the participants in a staple food value chain: traders and consumers. These findings can 
contribute to the design of public policies and international donor’s interventions that can 
help reduce the burden of disease caused by the consumption of unsafe food. 
Several projects and studies are currently being conducted to try to improve the 
safety of food produced and consumed in poor countries. For example, the development 
of biological-control products to reduce staple food contamination with aflatoxins is 
currently underway in several Sub-Saharan African countries (IITA, 2013; IITA, 2014). 
The study of demand for safer food in these settings can be a useful input for the 
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implementation at larger scales of new solutions found to the problem of widespread 
consumption of unsafe food.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I discuss the evolution of 
food safety regulation in industrialized countries since the end of the 19
th
 century, 
compared to developing countries, focusing on the different drivers that have led to 
stringent regulations in this field in these two groups of economies. I also describe the 
literature that centers on the valuation of safer food in developed countries—highlighting 
the main topics studied and findings—and compare it to the thin existent literature that 
studies the demand for safer food in developing countries. Chapter 3 presents the traders 




Chapter 2: Evolution of food safety policy and research around 
the world in the last century 
2.1 A comparison of the drivers of food safety reforms between developed 
and developing economies 
 
The story of the evolution of modern food safety policy can be seen as a succession 
of responses to food and drug related scandals that had huge economic costs and a 
significant toll on human health and life. For over a century, food safety concerns arising 
from these scandals have resulted in strong regulatory responses from governments in the 
industrialized world. However, the advancement of these policies in the developing world 
has been much more recent, slower and incomplete than in developed countries
3
, and it is 
mostly responding to a different type of drivers.  
The beginning of the 20th century brought about big changes in food safety policy 
in the industrialized world. Encouraged by vast technological progress during the last 
decades of the 19th century, food production and processing had experienced a huge 
transformation as they moved away from a local to an industrial scale, and food 
marketing and distribution got to know much wider limits. Several food safety scandals 
(e.g. the “embalmed meat scandal” in the US) created pressure to have new food safety 
policies and regulations in order to manage the new risks to human health.4 These crises, 
                                                 
3
 The use of the terms “developing country”, “developed country”, “middle income country”, 
“high income country” and “low income country” is based on the United Nations’ country 
classifications, detailed in the World Economic Situation and Prospects 2015. 
4
 US troops combating in Cuba during the Spanish-American War in 1898 were fed rotten canned 
beef that was later blamed for killing “more troops than Spanish bullets did” (Johnson, 1982). 
Even though, according to Keuchel (1974), it was not proved that it was the canned beef what 
killed the troops, the “embalmed beef scandal”, as was popularly called, helped raise public 
awareness of the dangers of eating unsafe meat.     
10 
 
together with emerging medical and bacteriological research that contributed to spread 
awareness of food-related health risks, indicated that policies and institutions that had 
been managing food risks until then were not able to protect consumers anymore in more 
integrated economies (Hoffmann and Harder, 2010; Spiekermann, 2010). 
In the US, the enactment in 1906 of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, the first major 
food safety law, was the response to a strong public demand for change in this field. 
There were two main factors that led to an increase in public pressure and a decrease in 
the sales of certain food products that became unsafe in consumers’ eyes. First, a public 
official and chemist (Harvey W. Wiley) led a grass root movement concerned about the 
use of unsafe chemicals in food processing—the Pure Foods Movement—and, as chief of 
the Bureau of Chemistry (now the Food and Drug Administration, FDA), conducted 
studies that brought national awareness to the problem. Second, a journalist’s work 
showed the health violations and unsanitary practices that were taking place in the 
meatpacking industry.
5
 Three decades later, a new food safety scandal that involved a 
drug containing a poisonous ingredient that killed over 100 people accelerated the 
enactment in 1938 of the improved Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which remains the 
basis of current FDA regulation.  
Some European countries went through similar processes in the modernization of 
their food safety policies. In some cases, due to the increase in international food trade 
that was taking place at the end of the 19
th
 century, food safety became a source of 
disputes between developed countries. For instance, before 1880 Germany saw over 500 
people die of trichinosis, which led the government to take food safety measures in the 
                                                 
5
 In 1906, the journalist Upton Sinclair published the novel The Jungle, which was turned into a 
movie in 1914.  
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pork industry, such as the implementation of an extensive control system that included 
25,000 pork inspectors (Spiekermann, 2010). The lack of application of similar measures 
in the US led Germany to ban imports of US pork between 1880 and 1891. This decade 
of intense trade disputes between the two countries—later called the German–American 
Pork War—put pressure on the US government to implement pork safety measures in the 
local industry.  
The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the current century saw a new 
series of food safety crises in the developed world (e.g. the “mad cow disease” scandal in 
Europe) that brought food safety policy under the spotlight and started a new wave of 
policy reforms that is still under way (Hoffmann and Harder, 2010; Hoffmann, 2010; 
Unnevehr and Hoffmann, 2015).
6
 The globalization of the world economy, characterized 
by an unprecedented volume of global fresh-food trade, as well as technological advances 
that radically modified agricultural production, processing and transportation, have 
produced huge changes in food supply chains worldwide. These changes have also 
created a very clear challenge for public health (as well as for agricultural health): 
globalized food trade can spread foodborne diseases across different countries and 
continents much more rapidly. Further, progress made in food hazard detection and 
epidemiology has increased knowledge and awareness of food-related problems. The 
World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, which 
has incorporated standards from the Codex Alimentarius Commission, has been—since 
                                                 
6
 The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad cow disease” crisis that started in the 
UK in the mid 1980s caused over 200 deaths and severely affected the beef industry in the UK 
and the rest of the EU for more than a decade. Other examples of recent food safety scandals are: 
the Belgian dioxin crisis in 1999 that affected several agricultural industries due to animal feed 
contamination with carcinogenic dioxin and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); and the several 
Chinese exports found to be adulterated with melamine, such as wheat gluten exported to the US 
in 2007, which was blamed for killing thousands of pets.  
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1995 when it came into effect—an international attempt to deal with some of these new 
challenges, setting new harmonized rules for international agricultural trade.
7
 Responses 
at the national and regional levels include, for example, the passing in 2002 of a new EU-
wide integrated food safety law (the General Food Law), and the implementation of 
major food safety legislative reforms by many other OECD countries since the 1990s 
(Hoffmann and Harder, 2010). 
Both internal and external factors have led to this second generation of food safety 
policy reforms in the developed world. In the case of the UK, which faced intense 
pressure from local consumers due to the poor handling of the “mad cow disease” crisis, 
the drivers have been mainly internal. Other countries, such as Canada and Australia, 
which have traditionally been exporters of agricultural products, have strengthened their 
food safety regulations and monitoring mostly because of external factors, i.e., the goal to 
maintain access to existing export markets and gain access to new markets (Hobbs et al., 
2002).  
As part of the large changes to global food production and trade described above, 
developing countries began to experience similar pressure to improve their food safety 
regulation systems (Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Hoffmann and Harder, 2010; Swinnen and 
Vandeplas, 2011). The integration of world markets and the globalization of food supply 
chains that have taken place in the last three decades have created big opportunities for 
developing countries—in particular middle income countries—that have had the chance 
to export nontraditional agricultural products to high-income countries (Diaz-Bonilla and 
                                                 
7
 The Codex Alimentarius Commission was established in 1963 by the United Nations’ Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO) as an international 
technical organ that would develop food safety and quality standards. 
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Reca, 2000; Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Pingali, 2007).
8
 At a macroeconomic level, food 
exports to richer markets have contributed to increase developing countries’ foreign 
exchange earnings. At a microeconomic level, export-oriented farmers and industries in 
developing countries have benefited from higher prices, sales and income (Jaffee and 
Henson, 2004; Reardon et al., 2009; Maertens et al., 2012).
 
    
However, for most developing countries it has been a challenge to profit from 
increased global food trade, as local institutions lacked the capacities to regulate food 
production, processing and distribution in order for export products to comply with 
importing countries’ rising food safety and quality standards (Reardon et al., 1999; 
Reardon and Farina, 2001; Reardon et al., 2009).
9
 Further, the fact that these regulations 
can introduce new non-tariff technical barriers to trade that could be used by developed 
countries in a discriminatory or protectionist manner, increased developing countries’ 
concerns of their ability to comply with them (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). What is more, 
not only the public sector but also the private sector had its own limitations in terms of 
capacity to comply with these higher standards. Changes in the institutional framework 
and regulatory capacity were needed, in this case, not to manage changes in local health 
risks, but to be able to export food products to countries with more stringent regulations, 
while minimizing bans and consignment rejections. Hence, efforts to strengthen food 
safety policy were driven by market access requirements related to high-value export 
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 Traditional agricultural exports include commodities such as coffee, sugarcane, cacao, 
beef, cotton and bananas. Non-traditional agricultural exports comprise high-value fresh 
and processed fruits and vegetables, flowers and nuts. 
9
 Examples of public and private food safety and quality requirements that are often faced by 
developing country exporters are: the accreditation of specific quality and private management 
certifications (such as HACCP, ISO, GlobalGAP, etc.); the abiding by maximum pesticide 
residue limits in fresh produce and by limits to other contaminants (such as mycotoxins in certain 
grains and nuts); and the adoption of traceability systems.   
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products (Unnevehr and Hoffmann, 2015). While a century ago developed countries had 
to deal with regulating food production and trade in newly nationally-integrated 
economies, developing countries have recently had to adapt their food production and 
food safety regulation systems—or part of them—to the requirements of a globalized 
economy. In the process of adapting to stringent standards and regulations, developing 
countries have sometimes faced trade disruptions and export bans and have incurred in 




What this process has created in many developing countries is the coexistence of 
double standards in the regulation of food safety. The case of India is a perfect example, 
as food safety is regulated by two distinct governmental agencies: the Export Inspection 
Council (EIC), the main export regulatory and certification body; and the recently created 
Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), in charge of governing the safety 
of processed food for sale in the local market.
11
 In the 1990s, India began to suffer 
several export rejections, detentions and bans that affected a range of food products 
including spices, peanuts, mangoes, grapes, tea, eggs, dairy and marine products (Das, 
2008). Pressure from importing countries as well as the WTO through its standards 
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 Examples of trade losses are: Thailand’s revenue losses from maize exports due to aflatoxin 
contamination above the importing countries’ accepted levels, estimated to be around $50 million 
per year; India’s drop in peanut meal exports to the EU by more than $30 million per year after 
stricter mycotoxin regulations were imposed by the EU in the early 1980s (Dohlman, 2003). 
Some examples of export bans imposed by developed countries to developing countries due to 
noncompliance with food safety standards include: EU bans on fishery products from Bangladesh 
in 1997, from Kenya in 1997-2000 and from Malaysia in 1998; and US ban on Guatemalan 
raspberries in 1997-1998 (Unnevehr and Ronchi, 2014).  
11
 The passing in 2006 of the Food Safety and Standards Act transformed the previously 
uncoordinated and ineffective Indian food safety system and created a single responsible agency 




stimulated reform in the export sector’s food safety regulation, which required large 
investments in laboratories and the creation of adequate expertise. This regulatory reform 
later served as a model for domestic reform—that started with the creation of the FSSAI 
in 2006—through the transfer of knowledge, rules and production practices (Epstein, 
2011). As Epstein (2011) states in her PhD dissertation on this topic, “while there is a 
formal firewall between formal regulation of domestically-consumed and exported 
foodstuffs, there are a number of formal and informal pathways of influence”. One of the 
main reasons to encourage local food safety reform was to make Indian goods more 
competitive with high-quality imports (Epstein, 2011), as India has gone through a period 
of successful growth and rising income that has enlarged its middle class, which has 
higher demand for safer food.  
The Indian case typifies what many middle income countries have gone through in 
their attempt to increase their exports to high income countries, and demonstrates the 
positive externalities on domestic food safety that can arise through export-oriented 
reforms. Such externalities may also arise through private sector actions to meet stringent 
food safety and quality regulations mandated in export markets, such as the cases of 
Kenyan fresh vegetable exporters and the Peruvian asparagus industry (Jaffee and 
Henson, 2004; Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2011).  
China, another emerging economy, presents a different case, in which the pressure 
generated by serious public health incidents related to food safety, combined with 
pressure from the international community that imports Chinese food products, led to a 
reform that is still at an early stage. After a series of food safety incidents, the high-
profile 2008 milk powder scandal proved to policymakers that a serious food safety 
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reform was urgently needed.
12
 Six babies died and around 290,000 people—mostly 
infants—were poisoned due to the consumption of milk powder adulterated with 
melamine, a toxic industrial chemical added to fake higher protein content (Xiu and 
Klein, 2010). The economic losses were so huge and the pressure from consumers and 
external governments were so strong that the Chinese government was forced to reform 
food safety regulation. The country passed a new food safety law—which was later 
updated in 2015—and took several regulatory measures, first in the milk industry and 
later on in other industries. However, food safety regulation has a long way to go in the 
country, as inadequate compliance and enforcement are still present in a country that 
struggles to modernize its food supply chains in its transition to a market economy (Jia et 
al., 2012; The New York Times, 2014; Forbes, 2016).  
While food safety scandals that exposed serious public health issues contributed to 
major rapid changes in developed and some developing countries’ food safety regulation, 
this does not seem to have been the case in many of the less developed countries. For 
example, even though the 2004 aflatoxicosis outbreaks in Kenya killed over 100 people 
who had consumed contaminated maize and exposed the severity of aflatoxin 
contamination prevalence in the country, the incident did not lead to major changes in 
local food safety policy. However, these outbreaks did have a huge impact on the 
international donor community that since then has increased the amount of grants and 
research to help control the serious food safety problem in the maize value chain in 
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 Some of the Chinese food safety scandals that occurred prior to 2008 include: the poisoned rice 
scandal, in which rice factories were found to be producing rice by polishing and whitening 
mouldy rice and mixing it with mineral oil; the hair solution scandal, in which soy sauce factories 
were found to be using hair dissolved by hydrochloric acid and water in the production of soy 
sauce; the colouring use scandal, in which rice noodle factories and a sugar factory were found to 
be using a bleaching agent to whiten the rice noodles and sugar; and the fake milk scandal, in 
which 70 babies died of malnutrition for consuming fake milk powder (Yongmin, 2004).  
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Kenya, which in turn also created pressure for local policy reform. This suggests that 
public health concerns alone may not be sufficient as a driver of major food safety policy 
change in less developed countries. The fact that these economies face many other 
competing public health issues (e.g. malaria, HIV) and have weaker institutional 
frameworks may help to explain this difference in governmental regulatory responses in 
the face of large food scares. 
It is also worth analyzing the Latin American case, as the subcontinent includes 
countries with very different levels of development, and has become a large exporter of 
fresh produce to both developed and—increasingly—developing countries.
13
 At the end 
of 2015, I conducted a survey of food safety directors and animal and plant health 
officials of 13 Latin American countries.
14
 When asked if they believed that the 
governments of their countries were giving more importance to food safety than 20 years 
ago, all of them gave a positive answer. Further, when asked what they believed was the 
main reason that had encouraged the public sector to give more importance to food safety 
issues in their countries, 70% of them chose an export-related reason (government’s 
intention to promote exports, pressure from food producers that want to export their 
products, and pressure from exporters that want to reduce export rejections caused by 
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 For instance, of the top 10 countries exporting fresh produce to the US, eight are in Latin 
America (Johnson, 2014). Also, from 2006 to 2009, Latin America’s contributed 14% of world 
agricultural exports. It produced, for example, 70% of banana exports, 45% of coffee and sugar 
exports, 44% of beef exports, 42% of poultry exports and 33% of maize exports (Sennhauser et 
al., 2014).  
14
 The survey was conducted at a seminar on Agricultural Health and Food Safety organized by 
the Inter-American Development Bank in Managua, Nicaragua in November 2015. Food safety 
directors and animal and plant health authorities (who have the responsibility of food safety 
regulation in most countries) responded a survey that aimed to assess the main changes 
experienced by their countries’ food safety policies and their main weaknesses. Officials from 
Uruguay, Belize, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Paraguay, Barbados, 
Chile, Jamaica, Argentina, Costa Rica and Peru answered the questionnaire. The other 20 Latin 
American countries did not have representatives at the seminar.  
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food safety reasons). The other 30% mentioned the government’s interest in reducing 
cases of foodborne diseases as the main reason, but also chose export-related reasons for 
the second main reason that explained the increased importance of food safety regulation. 
Also, when asked if the food safety authorities in their countries paid more attention to 
the compliance with the regulations by exporting firms, 70% of the officials gave an 
affirmative answer. 
These answers reflect the fact that being a large food exporting region, developed 
countries’ food safety standards have had a huge impact in the modernization of food 
safety management in most Latin American economies. There seems to exist some level 
of agreement that food safety regulation of food consumed domestically is laxer than 
food meant for export. However, no studies or reports were found that analyze this 
difference or the possible positive spillovers that the improved regulation of food for 
export might have generated on the regulation of locally-consumed food. Despite the 
focus on exports among food safety regulators, Latin American exporters still face a 
significant number of food safety related rejections. Using data from INTradeBID, I 
calculated the total number of rejections from the US suffered by Latin American 
agricultural exports due to food safety reasons: in 2011, 2489 consignments were rejected 
by the US (containing mostly fruits, vegetables, fishery products and cereals). The data 
also shows that the most frequent reasons for these rejections were presence of bacteria, 
failure to comply with satisfactory hygiene standards, and presence of pesticide residues 
above the permitted levels.
15
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 https://www.intradebid.org/site/ (accessed in May 2015). The data shows the occurrence of 




In the process of improving their food safety policies, developing countries can 
benefit from the experiences of developed countries in their own reform processes. 
However, there are certain characteristics that are specific to the challenges faced by 
developing countries. For example, in the poorest countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, when approaching food safety reforms governments need to take into 
consideration the large informal sector that dominates food systems, which is harder to 
regulate due to the small-scale nature of its activities and is generally unable to compete 
with the formal sector. While small informal activities may not comply with safe food 
production and handling regulations—when they exist—, they still play very important 
economic and social functions. Stricter food safety regulations, if not enforced gradually 
and possibly selectively, risk damaging the informal sector, on which the poorest 
typically rely, both for income and as a source of affordable food. Also, when there is 
competition between the informal and formal sectors in a food supply chain, regulatory 
efforts risk generating opposition between them, which can end up harming either or both 
sectors, consumers and production. Even worse, a regulation solely based on a market-
based approach that encourages formal sector firms to reject the lower quality food could 
end up pushing the more unhealthy food to the informal sector, therefore exposing the 
poorer to greater health risks (Moser and Hoffmann, 2015; Grace et al., 2015).  
The high quality and safety standards mandated in the current globalized economy 
set a very high bar for the large informal sector in poor countries. Developed nations’ 
informal sector not only represents a smaller fraction of their economies (Kus, 2010), but 
also is in better shape to function in a more stringent environment (as far as food safety 
and quality standards are concerned). Hence, when facing modern food safety regulatory 
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reforms, developing economies must deal with big tensions created by the coexistence of 
a modern formal sector and a large informal backward sector in food production and 
processing.  
The case of dairy regulation in Kenya represents a successful story of how this 
regulatory challenge was handled in a food chain oriented to local consumption and 
presents an example of how the combination of public health concerns and politicians’ 
intent to gain constituencies’ approval can lead to local food safety reform in developing 
countries. In 2003, a “milk war” between large formal milk processors and small-scale 
informal (unlicensed) vendors of raw milk took place because processors believed they 
were being hurt by unfair competition and blamed the small vendors for selling 
adulterated milk. A popular new government in place in Kenya, that had previously 
announced its intention to harmonize the agricultural sector regulatory framework, was 
able to solve this tension between the two sectors, increase dairy production and help 
small vendors improve the safety of the milk they sold (Leksmono et al., 2006). This was 
achieved by allowing small vendors to legally transport and sell milk in licensed milk 
bars, which was previously considered illegal, and providing them support to improve 
hygiene standards. According to Leksmono et al. (2006), the Kenyan government chose 
this sector to implement a food safety reform because as the dairy sector was 
smallholder-based and offered large pro-poor economic benefits, it was an opportunity to 
be seen addressing important social and economic needs. Hence, in this case the driver of 
the reform—that comprised food safety reasons among others—was an internal factor.  
In the case of Uganda, it is interesting to compare two different food value chains 
that were driven to food safety reforms by different factors. As in many other developing 
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countries, the export-oriented fisheries sector went through a food safety regulatory 
reform due to the influence of developed countries’ market access requirements. Between 
1997 and 2000, the EU placed three bans on Ugandan exports of Nile perch, the country's 
main nontraditional export product, on the basis of food safety concerns. This led to a 
large reform of food safety regulation of fish destined to the export markets, while fish 
destined to the local and regional markets were never subject to any regulation (Ponte, 
2007). The joint effort of the regulatory agency and the local processing industry helped 
implement new regulations and procedures in order to improve hygiene at landing sites 
and build laboratory testing capacity (Kjaer et al., 2012). This led to a transformation of 
the Nile perch export industry in the country and enabled the resumption of Ugandan fish 
exports to the EU.  
The Ugandan dairy sector—which solely sells to the domestic market—also went 
through a successful regulatory reform that led to a food safety improvement in the milk 
chain. In contrast to the fisheries sector, this reform was not motivated by the need to 
comply with foreign higher-quality standards to attain access to export markets. A 
regulatory governmental office (the Dairy Development Authority, DDA) was set up in 
2000 and became an efficient well-funded agency that has managed to gradually 
implement a regulatory reform that has led to an improvement in the quality of milk sold 
by informal traders, who constitute 80 percent of the sector (Kjaer et al., 2012). Traders 
and farmers were persuaded to incorporate affordable technological improvements after a 
series of bans that prohibited the use of unsanitary practices. According to Kjaer et al. 
(2012), the success of the reform could be explained by the existence of support from 
both the formal milk processing sector (that saw unfair competition in informal traders) 
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and the ruling political coalition (who themselves owned cattle), together with the 
gradualism of the implementation of the reform given the constant complaints from the 
informal sector. While the private interests of the elite appear to have been important in 
explaining some successful regulatory stories, particularly in Africa, private interests do 
not seem to have had a significant role in motivating reforms in developed countries, 
possibly because there is little to gain from increased regulation in the absence of 
competition from the informal sector.    
After briefly reviewing the last century of evolution of food safety policy around 
the world, it should be apparent that the drivers that have led to reform in more advanced 
economies differ from the ones that have pushed more backward countries to implement 
change. While most developed economies have faced the first generation of food safety 
reforms more than a century ago, as well as the current wave of reforms, due to public 
health reasons in the context of increased food trade, most developing countries’ 
motivation to modernize food safety regulation has been to comply with higher quality 
standards in order to gain access to markets in wealthier countries. Nonetheless, a 
common trigger of their reform processes is the need to deal with the challenges that 
more integrated economies create: the nationwide integration that developed countries 
had to face more than a century ago, as production and trade spread within countries; and 
the worldwide integration that has deepened in the last decades and that has pushed local 
food safety regulations into a path of greater global standardization. 
In the process of reviewing several developing countries’ experiences, I found other 
drivers, aside from the need to comply with rising food safety standards, that have also 
motivated food safety reforms in certain local food value chains: i) to be able to compete 
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with higher quality food imports (e.g. Indian case); ii) to regain credibility among the 
local population as well as decrease cases of foodborne disease after high profile food 
safety scandals (e.g. China’s case); iii) pressure for reform from the international donor 
community working on food safety topics in the country (e.g. Kenya’s case); and iv) to 
provide economic benefits to influential political stakeholders  (e.g. dairy sectors in 
Kenya and Uganda). Even though this list is necessarily incomplete, it provides hope that 
food safety reforms in developing countries can also improve the quality of food locally 
consumed in these countries, especially by the poorest that have no access to formal 
domestic markets (e.g. supermarkets that mostly serve the middle and upper classes).   
2.2 Research on demand for safer food in the developed and developing 
worlds: differences in topics studied and some key findings 
 
Agricultural economics research has accompanied the differential evolution of food 
safety policy described in the previous section by picking different topics and answering 
different questions in each of the two areas of the world. Here I focus on research on 
demand for safer and higher quality food, which is the topic of this dissertation.  
The largest part of food safety research focuses on developed countries’ concerns, 
and as food safety reaches higher standards in these countries, it is increasingly becoming 
part of the broader study of food quality.
16
 Many authors have studied the effect on food 
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 The term “food quality” encompasses several food attributes that can be grouped in subsets, 
such as: food safety, nutrition (e.g., fat, vitamins), value (e.g., appearance, taste), packaging (e.g., 
labeling), and production and processing practices (e.g., organically produced, irradiated) 
(Hooker and Caswell, 1996; Roe and Sheldon, 2007). Food safety attributes include foodborne 
pathogens, heavy metals, pesticide residues, food additives, naturally occurring toxins and 
veterinary residues (Henson and Traill, 1993). Because some food safety attributes are 
intrinsically linked to other food quality characteristics, the definition of what is considered food 
safety research has some degree of flexibility. For instance, pesticide residues above a certain 
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demand of different food safety attributes, such as levels of microbial pathogens, 
pesticide residues, and most recently the use of biotechnology and antibiotics and 
hormones in animals meant for food. Unnevehr et al. (2010) review several papers that 
study these topics in developed countries and conclude that demand for food is heavily 
influenced by food quality attributes—food safety included—aside from food prices and 
income.  
A connected area of research focuses on the impact of information related to food 
safety and health on food demand and consumer welfare. Information can help reduce 
market failures such as information asymmetries between producers, intermediaries and 
consumers, and therefore influence consumers’ valuation of food. Amid different ways of 
providing information, the most studied have been the use of food labels, government and 
third-party certifications, process and product performance standards and information 
campaigns. Most of these studies show that the provision of information can help align 
choices with preferences and hence lead to welfare gains. For example, Mazzocchi et al. 
(2004) prove the existence of welfare gains when timely food safety information is 
provided in the event of food scares, using data from an episode related to “mad cow 
disease” in Italy. The authors estimate a measure of consumers’ cost of ignorance by 
comparing the utility derived from informed choices with the utility of uninformed 
choices, based on the concerns suffered by consumers given their inability to adjust their 
consumption behavior while the information was not disclosed. Also, Teisl et al. (2001) 
conclude that nutrient labeling together with an information campaign to educate US 
consumers affect consumers’ purchase behavior and can lead to welfare gains.  
                                                                                                                                                 
limit can clearly be a food safety issue, while organic production in general can be considered a 
different food quality feature. 
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There is a related large body of work that aims to measure willingness to pay for 
food with specific quality and safety attributes, using different preference elicitation 
techniques such as stated preference methods (e.g., contingent valuation and conjoint-
based techniques) and revealed preference methods (e.g., experimental auctions and 
hedonic pricing). The development of these techniques has made a large contribution to 
the economics literature in terms of providing ways to estimate implicit prices of goods 
and attributes for which there are no markets. For instance, using a stated preference 
method to estimate willingness to pay for beef, Loureiro and Umberger (2007) show that 
US consumers value certification of USDA food safety inspection more than other 
attributes, such as country-of-origin labeling and traceability.  
All these lines of research are mostly focused on developed countries, either 
through the development of theoretical models that capture food safety topics that pertain 
to these countries’ realities, or through empirical applications that use data from higher 
income countries. When it comes to food safety in developing countries, the existent 
literature is much scarcer and has a strong focus on the impact of developed countries’ 
food safety standards on developing countries’ exports and income (Henson et al., 2000; 
Otsuki et al., 2001; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Jaffee and Masakure, 2005; Henson and 
Jaffee, 2008; Asfaw et al., 2009). Unnevehr and Ronchi (2014) present a literature review 
of recent papers that focus on this topic, most of which analyze the impact of 
industrialized countries’ public and private food safety standards on several outcomes, 
such as: bilateral trade flows; the existence of benefits for specific exporting value chains 
in developing countries; and whether smallholder farmers and small firms benefit from 
participating in high-value food chains affected by such standards. Unnevehr and Ronchi 
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(2014) conclude that there is solid evidence showing that developing countries obtain 
market access benefits from compliance with food safety standards, and that there is 
some preliminary evidence of possible spillovers for domestic health and productivity. 
An important caveat is that most of the literature reviewed by Unnevehr and Ronchi 
(2014) centers on the small market of horticultural products for export to the EU, so their 
conclusions may not be generalizable.  
Because most of this research centers on poor countries’ food production that is 
meant to be consumed abroad, the studies don’t aim to estimate local demand for safer 
food. Unnevehr and Ronchi (2014) conclude that “while much of the literature on 
impacts of food safety regulation in developed countries focuses on public health, in 
poorer countries the emphasis is on economic development”. This is why most of these 
studies on developing economies focus on comparing compliance costs with market 
access benefits, leaving aside local public health benefits.  
However, there is a relatively new and extremely thin literature that focuses on the 
existence of demand for safer food within developing economies (Ortega et al., 2011; Ifft 
et al., 2012; Birol et al., 2015; De Groote et al., 2016). These studies—that are reviewed 
in more detail in the following two chapters—find that there exists demand for safer food 
in the studied settings, which include a supermarket serving middle-upper classes in 
India, wet markets and supermarkets in urban China, and rural and informal market 
settings in Vietnam and Kenya, respectively.   
The fact that only recently some studies have focused on the impact of local food 
safety regulations within developing countries is not surprising after the historical review 
presented in the previous section. On top of the fact that in many developing countries 
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modern food safety regulation is a recent phenomenon, this lack of studies can be further 
explained by additional factors. First, in poor countries much of local food trade takes 
place in informal markets, in which actors’ incentives are harder to predict given the lack 
of regulation and monitoring, and in which food origin is harder—or even impossible—to 
trace. Second, among consumers in developing countries there is less awareness of health 
risks in general, and food safety threats in particular, and this worsens the fact that food 
poisoning symptoms and consequences can easily be confused with other health 
problems. This lack of awareness about food safety hazards also implies that there is 
usually little pressure from consumers demanding that resources be devoted to 
understanding and fighting these hazards. Finally, due to the pressing food shortage in 
developing countries, there’s some belief among the development community that food 
safety should be of concern at a later stage in the development process (i.e., food 
availability comes first). Due to all these factors, many questions remain unanswered in 
this field. This dissertation aims to contribute to this literature, focusing on the factors 










Enforcement of food safety regulations is often weak in developing countries, 
particularly within markets for locally consumed food. Because food safety comprises 
mostly unobservable characteristics, the absence of certifications and information labels 
in these settings leads to uninformed consumption choices that can have negative health 
consequences. Maize quality comprises both observable attributes (e.g., kernel size, 
presence of broken grains, insect damage, etc.) and unobservable or difficult to observe 
attributes, such as aflatoxin contamination and moisture content. Because aflatoxin 
contamination makes maize consumption extremely harmful to human health, making 
this attribute observable is important for public health reasons.  
High moisture content in maize can allow the growth of molds, which affects taste 
and can also lead to aflatoxin contamination. The fact that moisture and aflatoxin content 
are difficult to observe implies that they are not adequately rewarded in the market, hence 
discouraging the production and sale of higher quality maize. Therefore, transforming 
these unobservable characteristics into observable ones has the potential to strengthen the 
link between healthfulness and price in the maize value chain in Kenya. This in turn 
could create incentives for farmers and traders to invest in farming, handling and trading 
practices that increase the availability of safe food. Because measuring grain moisture 
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 This research was funded with resources from the University of Maryland’s ADVANCE Seed Grant 
Program 2011-2012.  
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content is much cheaper than testing for aflatoxin, the provision of moisture content 
information could potentially be a more cost-effective policy tool than aflatoxin testing. 
Previous work conducted in similar settings provides some evidence that maize 
quality information is valued by consumers. Hoffmann and Gatobu (2014) show that 
Kenyan smallholder farmers were willing to pay over 21% more for their self-produced 
maize than for maize procured from local markets, and providing information on the 
safety of market-sourced maize reduced this gap. This suggests that farmers may have 
some private information about the quality of the maize they produce, and they realize as 
well that they do not have the same type of information on maize grown and traded by 
others. Another study shows that maize that has been purchased is more likely to be 
aflatoxin contaminated than self-produced maize, indicating that marketed maize is on 
average of inferior quality (Hoffmann et al., 2013). These results imply that the limited 
observability of maize safety may create asymmetric information problems in this 
market.  
In this study, I explore whether the provision of food quality information that 
would otherwise be hard or impossible to assess in this setting leads to a price premium. 
Hoffmann et al. (2013) show that observable maize attributes, such as the presence of 
rotten and broken grains, have a negative effect on price, but unobservable attributes, 
such as aflatoxin contamination, does not. This coincides with the results of a survey 
conducted by Nyoro et al. (1999) that covered 200 traders of different types in several 
towns across Kenya. These traders reported that quality differences, such as color, size of 
kernels, and amount of foreign material, are distinguished by eyesight and used as the 
main criteria determining quality and price. However, the extent to which prices currently 
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respond to maize moisture content is not clear. This attribute may be partially observable 
to small traders and consumers, who do not have access to moisture meters, but can use 
simple methods such as biting and feeling grains to assess moisture.  
Using a framed field experiment, this research explores whether traders are willing 
to pay more for maize labeled as having lower moisture content and allowable levels of 
aflatoxin, and whether this depends on their ability to sell it at a premium in the market. 
The research design also allows examination of whether moisture content information is 
in fact unobservable for traders, or if they are already able to observe this attribute. To 
answer these questions, 369 traders from different markets across Kenya were invited to 
participate in a second-price sealed-bid auction in which information on moisture content 
and aflatoxin contamination of maize auctioned was varied experimentally using labels. 
  Several studies have used field experiments to investigate consumers’ willingness 
to pay for more nutritious food in developing country contexts where malnutrition is 
severe (Masters and Sanogo, 2002; Stevens and Winter-Nelson, 2008; Naico and Lusk, 
2010; Chowdhury et al., 2011; De Groote et al., 2011). However, there are extremely few 
studies that have focused on willingness to pay for food safety attributes in developing 
countries (Ifft et al., 2012; Birol et al., 2015). The closest study is the one by Ifft et al. 
(2012) that assesses willingness to pay for chicken labeled as safely produced in an 
informal market setting. The study concludes that consumers were willing to pay a 10-
15% premium for safer chicken. No study was found that attempted to assess willingness 
to pay for food safety among traders in informal market settings, instead of consumers. 
The advantage of focusing on traders is that they represent the closest link to farmers, 
who have a key role to play in improving maize quality.  
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In addition, this research investigates the role of traders in preserving or 
diminishing maize quality once it leaves the farm gate. Given previous findings, it is 
unclear whether the quality differential between homegrown and traded maize arises 
prior to sale, through farmers’ post-harvest practices and sorting behavior, or during 
transport and storage by traders. Previous studies focusing on maize traders are extremely 
few, possibly because their mobility and time constraints during market days make it 
challenging to interview them. Hence, not much is known about the practices, knowledge 
or incentives of traders as these relate to maize quality and safety. 
  Even though reliable technologies for measuring moisture content are out of the 
reach of most informal traders, it is much cheaper to test moisture than aflatoxin, so from 
a policy perspective it may have more potential for large-scale implementation. More 
accurate information on maize moisture content could potentially enable small-scale 
traders to target drier maize to buyers who are willing to pay a premium for higher 
quality maize. These could be formal buyers, such as the National Cereals and Produce 
Board (NCPB) and large millers, who have the technology to test for moisture content 
and are thought to pay higher prices. Also, customers may be willing to pay a premium 
for maize if they are better able to assess its quality. This premium for drier maize could 
be expected to pass all the way back to farmers, thus encouraging them to adopt more 
careful storage and drying practices which would in turn reduce the risk of fungal growth 





Ways to prevent crop contamination include both pre-harvest and post-harvest 
practices such as selection of drought-resistant and pest-resistant seeds, thorough drying 
and careful storage of crops, and removal of visibly moldy grains. 
Human exposure to aflatoxins occurs through ingestion of contaminated food, and 
consumption of milk or meat products from animals raised on contaminated feed. 
Chronic exposure to aflatoxins has been associated in several studies with severe health 
effects such as liver cancer, depressed immune response and growth faltering among 
children (Turner et al., 2003; Williams et al., 2004; Strosnider et al., 2006; Shephard, 
2008). Ingestion of large amounts of aflatoxin contaminated food can even lead to 
death.
18
 It has been estimated that more than 5 billion people in developing countries 
worldwide are at risk of chronic exposure to aflatoxins through contaminated foods 
(Williams et al., 2004; Strosnider et al. 2006; Khlangwiset et al., 2011).  
Aflatoxin contamination cannot be detected by eye. Certain visible characteristics 
are associated with its presence, including rotten, moldy and discolored grains, 
unpleasant smell and bitter taste. However, none of these characteristics are exclusive to 
aflatoxin contamination and they are not always present in contaminated maize. This 
makes aflatoxin contamination mostly unobservable.  
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 In 2004, rural Kenya witnessed one of the largest aflatoxicosis outbreaks ever, which was 
caused by aflatoxin-contaminated maize and resulted in 317 cases and 125 deaths (Lewis et al., 
2005). The affected area was the Eastern Province, which had had a previous aflatoxicosis 
outbreak in 1981, that killed 12 (Ngindu et al., 1982). In 2010, aflatoxin contamination rendered 
at least 2.3 million bags of maize unfit for human and livestock consumption, and led 
Government officials in Kenya to offer to buy the contaminated maize in an effort to keep it off 
the market (Africa Online News, June 2010).  
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High moisture content is a necessary condition for fungal growth, which is in turn 
necessary for the production of fungal toxins such as aflatoxins. Since high moisture 
content is correlated with the fungus that produces aflatoxin, as well as many other fungi, 
moisture content serves as a good indicator of taste, and a less perfect, but still useful, 
warning sign of potential aflatoxin contamination (Oyebanji and Efiuvwevwere, 1999). 
Although very high levels of moisture can be observed by feel, the same is not true for 
lower levels of moisture content at which fungi are able to grow. The Kenyan regulatory 
standard sets the maximum allowed moisture content for maize grains at 13.5%. In order 
to accurately assess the percentage moisture content in maize, a grain moisture meter 
must be used. The simplest maize moisture meter costs around USD 80, and more precise 
ones can be much more expensive. This puts accurate moisture testing out of reach for 
small-scale traders and farmers, whose annual income per capita at the time of the study 
was around USD 900.
19
 However, testing moisture content is much cheaper than testing 
for aflatoxin. Moisture meters can be used for many years, so the cost per test can be very 
low. Formal sector buyers test the moisture content of grains, and in general reject maize 
with moisture content above the standard of 13.5% (Nyoro et al., 1999). On the other 
hand, this regulation is not enforced in informal maize markets. There is anecdotal 
evidence that water is sometimes added deliberately to the grains before sale in order to 
increase the weight of the grain, leading to higher moisture content (USAID, 2011).  
Small-scale traders and consumers, who do not have access to moisture testing 
technology, use less accurate methods, such as biting and feeling the grains, to assess the 
humidity of the grains they purchase. 
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 In Kenya, the adjusted net national income per capita (in current USD) in 2011 was USD 912 
(World Bank, World Development Indicators).  
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The maximum aflatoxin content allowed in maize intended for human consumption 
by Kenyan regulatory standards is 10 ppb (parts per billion). However, enforcement of 
this regulation is highly imperfect. Aflatoxin content in maize can only be determined by 
specialized tests that are prohibitively expensive for use on quantities typically traded in 
informal markets. The price of a rapid aflatoxin test appropriate for field use can range 
between USD 4 and USD 13 per sample. Aflatoxin laboratory tests are of much less 
practical use in the field, as samples must first be transported to the lab for testing. This 
explains why the aflatoxin regulation is not enforced in informal markets, which serve the 
vast majority of Kenyans. According to interviews with industry stakeholders, few if any 
formal sector buyers were testing grain for aflatoxin at the time data was collected for 
this study (Hoffmann V., personal communication, July 12, 2016). Those who currently 
test for aflatoxin—a share which has increased in the time since data was collected (see 
APTECA, n.d.)—do so at the mill gate at the level of the truckload.
20
    
Estimates of aflatoxin prevalence in Kenya vary by area, year and role in the value 
chain. A study conducted between 2009 and 2011 as part of the Aflacontrol project 
shows that on average around 40% of maize samples from farmers’ fields had 
contamination levels above the regulatory limit, and the rate was even higher for maize 
from farmers’ stores and from markets (IFPRI, 2012). In terms of regional variation, 
samples in the Eastern province, a high aflatoxin risk area, had higher prevalence, as 
expected. One of the conclusions of this study is that storage practices seem to be an 
                                                 
20
 In theory, when maize imports arrive at the port, moisture and aflatoxin content are tested by 
the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) and the Kenyan Plant Health Inspectorate Services 
(KEPHIS). However, this does not seem to be the case according to what was mentioned in 
several interviews with different stakeholders in the country, and no data was found that would 
back up this assertion. In practice, private laboratories are sometimes hired to perform aflatoxin 
tests by formal sector buyers, but there is no government control over this (Kimani and Gruère, 
2010; Kang’ethe, 2011). 
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important determinant of contamination, and that more research should be done on maize 
available at the markets. 
Half of Kenya´s maize production is produced by small farmers who have on 
average 5 acres of cultivated land (Kirimi et al., 2011). This implies that changing maize 
cultivation and handling practices in order to reduce the risk of aflatoxin contamination 
would involve targeting a large number of farmers.  
There are different types of maize traders in Kenya and they can be classified into 
the following categories: wholesalers, assemblers, dis-assemblers, retailers, posho-millers 
and large millers (Nyoro et al., 1999). Assemblers are usually the first purchasers of 
maize, as they buy maize from farmers and sell it to wholesalers, dis-assemblers and 
retailers. Assemblers are usually mid-size traders operating in a single town through 
stores or stalls. Wholesalers (also called lorry traders) buy mainly from assemblers in 
maize surplus regions during the harvest season and sell to milling companies or local 
retailers in deficit regions. Dis-assemblers buy maize mainly from large wholesalers in 
deficit areas and sell in reduced quantities to retailers and final consumers. Retailers buy 
from dis-assemblers, wholesalers or even farmers and sell in small quantities to 
consumers. Posho-millers are small operations to which consumers bring maize grains to 
have them ground into whole maize meal (posho) using a simple hammer-milling 
technology. Large millers use capital intensive roller-milling technology to process large 
amounts of maize, and they do their own packaging of maize meal products. Large 
millers mainly buy from wholesalers during the peak season and from NCPB stocks 
when maize is scarce.  
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This study focuses on small and mid-size traders offering maize grains for sale at 
open-air markets. Most of them were retailers, but there were also assemblers and dis-
assemblers. A thorough description of the traders included in this study is provided in the 
Results section.  
3.3 Experimental design  
From September to November 2011, a convenience sample of 369 traders was 
recruited at nine open-air cereal markets across Kenya to participate in the study.
21
 The 
markets were purposely selected in seven different agro-ecological zones, which have 
very different maize producing capacities and susceptibility to aflatoxin contamination. 
The study was timed to span several points in the maize harvest cycle. Variation in both 
timing and location leads to differences in maize supply, and thus prices. This variation is 
expected to impact the extent to which food quality and safety information is rewarded in 
the market, and thus traders’ valuation of such information.  
Three of these markets are located in the Eastern province (Gakoromone and Chuka 
in Upper Eastern, and Machakos in Lower Eastern), considered a high-aflatoxin risk and 
maize-deficit area. Two other markets are located in the Rift Valley province (Eldoret 
and Kitale) and are part of what is known as Kenya’s grain basket, the high-potential 
maize zone, and thought to be a low-aflatoxin risk area. Two markets were selected in the 
Western province (Bungoma and Webuye), both maize surplus areas and thought to have 
low aflatoxin prevalence. Finally, the last two markets are in the Nyanza province (Kisii 
and Kisumu), which although it has traditionally been considered a low-aflatoxin risk 
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 Because market managers could not provide us with a roster of traders selling at the market, 
and because traders’ presence at the market was impossible to predict, it was not possible to use a 
random sampling strategy.  
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area, a recent study by IFPRI (2012) shows high levels of contamination in parts of this 
province (particularly in Kisii). Table 1 presents the list of markets covered in the study 
and summarizes their main characteristics.  
In terms of timing of the study, some markets were visited before the harvest 
season, others during the main harvest season, and others during the lean season. The 
study was conducted over three rounds, and each round covered three markets in very 
different parts of the country, which were in different points in their maize cycle. As 
shown in Table 1, this is reflected in the average prices of maize for sale at these markets. 
The average 90KG and 1KG prices in each market were calculated from the surveyed 
traders’ asking prices at the time of data collection.  
 
Table 1: Main characteristics of markets selected for the study 
 
 
At the markets, traders were approached at their stalls by the enumerators and 
invited to participate in the study, which was simply described as “a study about maize in 
Kenya”. They were briefly told what they would be asked to do, and that if they agreed to 















Gakoromone Eastern Central Highlands Deficit area Sept 1-2 Lean season 39 42 3579
Eldoret Rift Valley Lower Highlands Major surplus area Sept 6-7 Lean season 38 46 3428
Bungoma Western Western Transitional Surplus area Sept 8-9 Harvest season 39 38 2800
Chuka Eastern Central Highlands Deficit area Oct 10-11 Lean season 39 46 3818
Kitale Rift Valley Upper Midlands Major surplus area Oct 14-15 Harvest season 40 32 2611
Webuye Western Western Transitional Surplus area Oct 18-19 Harvest season 38 34 2715
Kisii Nyanza Western Highlands Deficit area Nov 15-16 Lean season¹ 56 47 3799
Kisumu Nyanza Western Lowlands Major deficit area Nov 18-19 Lean season¹ 40 43 3427
Machakos Eastern Eastern Lowlands Major deficit area Nov 22-23 Lean season 40 45 3717
TOTAL 369 41 3322
¹ Poor harvests due to bad w eather in these regions
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approximately USD 6) in compensation for their time.
22
 Those who agreed to participate 
were first interviewed to obtain information about their trading activities, their sorting, 
transporting and storage practices and their knowledge about aflatoxin and maize 
moisture content. Those traders who did not know the moisture content regulation were 
read a script with a brief explanation, as knowing the regulation could have a direct 
impact on their bids.
23
 Also, all traders were read a script with a short explanation of what 
a moisture meter is, as this was also important for them to be able to grasp the 
information that would later be provided in the auction area.
24
 The goal was to give all 
traders adequate context to make sense of the information that would later be provided. 
In addition to survey data, enumerators took samples of each trader’s maize (one of 
each different quality they had for sale) in order to assess its moisture content. 98% of the 
participating traders had only one type of maize for sale. After the survey, traders were 
invited to participate in a second-price sealed-bid auction for six bags of maize grain that 
took place in a secluded area of the market. The maize bags were 90KG, which is the 
usual unit of measure in Kenya for large maize transactions. At the auction, traders were 
shown six maize bags: two had “low moisture content” (less than 13.5%, i.e., in 
compliance with the regulation); two had “medium moisture content” (between 14 and 
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 Participating in our study took approximately an hour of traders’ working time, as the survey 
had to be interrupted every time a customer arrived. Also, it implied having to leave their stall 
unattended while they were in the auction session.  Therefore, a monetary compensation had to be 
offered in order to induce traders to participate.  
23
 If traders knew the maize moisture content regulation, it was emphasized to them that they 
were right and a script was read to make clear that moisture content higher than 13.5% did not 
comply with the regulation. Traders who acknowledged not being aware of the moisture content 
regulation, were read the following script: “The maximum moisture content allowed by NCBP is 
13.5%. This means that if maize has higher moisture than this, it is not complying with the 
regulation”.  
24
 All traders were read the following script: “A moisture meter is a device to measure the level of 
moisture in maize. When you use it, the tool gives you a number that tells you how dry your 
maize is”.  
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15%); and two had “high moisture content” (between 17 and 19%). The bags that shared 
the same moisture content belonged to the same batch.
25
  
Five out of six traders (83% of the sample) were exposed to the “moisture 
information treatment” (MIT), which consisted of receiving the moisture content 
information for only one bag in each moisture pair. Information on moisture content was 
provided through large labels that were affixed to the 90KG maize bags. In other words, 
for each moisture content pair, one of the bags was marked with a label containing its 
moisture content range, and the other bag of the pair was not labeled.
26
 Every sixth trader 
(17% of the sample) was exposed to the “aflatoxin information treatment” (AIT), in 
which labels (for low and medium moisture pairs only) contained information on 
compliance of the maize with the aflatoxin regulation. The other two bags of each of 
these pairs were unlabeled. The tests for aflatoxin were conducted using rapid aflatoxin 
test strips (RIDA
®
QUICK Aflatoxin) according to manufacturer instructions. These tests 
do not require specialized skills to be conducted and produce quick results. In the AIT, 
both high moisture content bags had no information labels because they had not been 
tested for aflatoxin. Given the high correlation between moisture and aflatoxin 
contamination, it would have been challenging to find high moisture maize bags that 
were not contaminated. The reasons for keeping the two unlabeled high moisture bags 
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 The auctioned maize bags had been previously purchased in a different market from the one 
where the auction was taking place. When purchasing these bags, the seller was asked to bring a 
set of three bags that belonged to the same batch of maize he had purchased.  
26
 The “moisture information treatment” (MIT) labels used read: “Moisture content below 
13.5%”, “Moisture content between 14 and 15%”, “Moisture content between 17 and 19%”.  
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was to have a similar auction setting in the AIT as in the MIT, and to assess traders´ 
ability to recognize high moisture bags and their willingness to pay for these.
27
  
The bags that shared the same moisture content belonged to the same batch, and 
hence the maize contained in those bags was also similar in all observable characteristics. 
This was important in order to be able to attribute the differences in bids between bags in 
the same moisture range to differences in the information provided. In order to account 
for any possible observable difference in quality between the bags in the same moisture 
content pair, the label was switched between bags of the pair every other trader. 
Enumerators were trained to be extremely careful not to be seen by traders when 
switching the labels.  
When the trader arrived at the maize auction area, the auction rules were explained 
to her. A piece of paper was handed in to her, where she would have to write down the 
amount of money that she was willing to pay for each of the six maize bags. The bags’ 
labels were read out loud, to make sure that everybody understood the information that 
was being provided. Traders were told that one of the six bags would be sold at the end of 
the day, and the trader that had bid the highest for that bag would win the opportunity to 
buy it. The winning trader would pay the second highest price among the bids entered for 
that bag. The bag to actually be sold would be randomly chosen through a draw. If traders 
didn’t understand or didn´t take seriously that there was a positive probability that they 
would have to buy one of the auctioned maize bags, their bids would not reflect their true 
willingness to pay. Hence, in order to minimize the risk of having the winner of a bag be 
unwilling to buy it, it was explained to traders that if they won the auctioned bag, their 
                                                 
27
 In the “aflatoxin treatment information” (AIT) the labels used read: “Tested for aflatoxin: 
complies with regulation”. 
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compensation of 500 Ksh for participating in the study would be used toward the price of 
the bag. If they decided not to buy the bag, they would lose this compensation. 
Before starting the bidding for the bags, two practice rounds of bids for a pencil 
were conducted. After each practice round, traders were asked comprehension questions 
to test if they had understood the rules. If they had not understood, another practice round 
was conducted. This continued until the correct answer was given. After the first practice 
round, 72% of traders answered comprehension questions correctly, and after the second 
round, an additional 24% of traders demonstrated understanding of the auctions rules. 
This quick understanding could be explained by the fact that the sample consisted of 
experienced business people, the majority of whom had prior knowledge of auctions. In 
the survey 64% of traders said they knew what an auction was and 15% said they had 
participated in an auction before.  
Before submitting their bids, traders were allowed to inspect each bag as much as 
they wanted, as would be the case in a real market transaction. After the trader had 
written down the six bids, the piece of paper was put inside an envelope and it was set 
aside to be opened at the end of the day, with all the other bids.  
The goal of using a second-price sealed-bid auction was to have in place an 
incentive compatible mechanism that would elicit traders’ true valuation of the different 
maize qualities when otherwise unobservable information was provided. The second-
price auction method was chosen over other revealed preference methods (take-it-or-
leave-it offers at random prices or TIOLI, and the Becker Degroot Marschak mechanism  
or BDM), for more closely mimicking actual transactions compared to the BDM while 





3.4.1 Traders´ knowledge and practices 
Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of the 369 traders in the sample who, 
on average, were in their mid-thirties, had 8 years of formal education and had been in 
the maize trading business for less than a decade. In terms of size of their trading 
business, most of these traders can be considered “small”, as 66% of them usually sold 
maize in 1KG and 2KG units, and very few (12%) had ever sold to a formal buyer such 
as NCPB or a large miller. Also, most traders reported actively investing in the quality of 
maize in their possession: almost three quarters reported covering their maize during 
transport to protect it from rain (in polythene or in covered vehicles); a similar proportion 
reported sometimes drying and sorting the maize they purchased; and a quarter reported 
adding preservatives to their maize. Among those traders who reported using 
preservatives, more than half said they used the most common local insecticide for stored 
grain called Actellic.  
The majority of traders in the sample regularly sourced their maize from farmers: 
62% purchased only from farmers, 22% only from traders, and 15% from both farmers 
and traders. In terms of maize origin, 66% of traders usually bought maize that had been 
locally grown. This is not surprising given that if traders were mostly sourcing from 
farmers, it is reasonable to expect the latter to be local farmers, as this reduces 
transportation costs.  
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When it comes to maize sourcing preferences between types of farmers, the 
fraction of traders that preferred sourcing from small farmers doubled the fraction that 
instead preferred large farmers. The most mentioned reason for preferring small farmers 
was the good quality of their maize; the most mentioned reason for preferring large 
farmers was the lower price of their maize; and traders were most frequently preferred for 
being a reliable source of maize. These responses are in line with previous findings that 
have highlighted the belief among the local population that maize bought directly from 
farmers should be of higher quality than maize bought from traders (Hoffmann and 
Gatobu, 2014). These answers also show that there seems to be a belief—at least among 
traders—that the smaller the farmer, the higher the quality, as probably it is thought that 
smaller farms produce maize for sale following similar better farming, drying and storage 
practices to those employed to produce maize for own consumption.  
Half of the sample declared selling higher quality maize to different buyers from 
those to whom they sell their lower quality maize. Interestingly, almost all of these 
traders (44% of the whole sample) said they sold the higher quality maize to individuals, 
and only 4% of the sample said they sold the higher quality maize to formal buyers. 
Therefore, there could be some degree of reputation effect going on in these informal 
markets, in which customers tend to be recurring and traders try to keep their loyal 








Table 2: Mean characteristics of traders in the sample




Years of education 8
Years in maize trading 8
Trading Activities: Purchases and Sales
"Small" traders: usually sell in 1KG or 2KG units 66%
Source maize only from farmers 62%
Source maize only from traders 22%
Source maize both from farmers and traders 15%
Source maize locally grown (same town where traders operate) 66%
Sell only to individuals 25%
Ever sold to traders 59%
"Large" traders: only sell to traders, millers & schools 2%
Ever sold maize to formal buyer (NCPB or large miller) 12%
Had maize tested for moisture in at least 1 of the 3 last large purchases 5%
Maize quality
Most mentioned maize characteristic looked for when purchasing Dryness
Sell high quality and low quality maize to different buyers 53%
Sell high quality maize to formal buyer (NCPB or large miller) 4%
Sell high quality maize to individuals 44%
Sorting, Transportation and Storage Practices
Need to transport purchased maize 94%
Cover maize during transport to protect it from rain 73%
Dry purchased maize 69%
Sort purchased maize 66%
Number of days that maize is stored 19
Add preservatives to their maize 22%
Acknowledge having had low quality maize (went bad while stored or was purchased accidentally) 48%
When they have bad maize they mix it with good maize and sell it 20%
When they have bad maize they sort it and sell it at a lower price 14%
When they have bad maize they throw it away 12%
When they have bad maize they grind it and feed animals 2%
Had maize spoilage losses during current or previous season 15%
Personal Preferences
Prefer to buy maize for business only from farms 65%
Prefer to buy maize for business only from traders 21%
Grow own maize for own household consumption 56%
Get maize from store for own household consumption 20%
Aflatoxin Knowledge
Have heard of aflatoxin 79%
Gave a correct definition of what aflatoxin is 74%
Know aflatoxin is harmful for human health 75%
Know aflatoxin is linked to maize moisture 17%
Can tell if maize is contaminated observing its color 68%
Own maize traded in the past could be aflatoxin contaminated 28%
Think there may be contaminated maize in market on the survey day 8%
Moisture Meter Knowledge
Know what a moisture  meter is 49%
Have ever used a moisture meter 7%
Have every seen somebody using a moisture meter 37%
Own a moisture meter that works 1%
Think a moisture meter would help them better assess quality of maize 94%
Know that maxiumum moisture content allowed by NCPB is 13.5% 16%
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Almost half of the traders admitted having had at some point maize that went bad 
during storage or having purchased low quality maize accidentally. Among these traders, 
43% said that when this happened they would mix the low quality maize with the higher 
quality maize; 30% said they would sort out the low quality maize and sell it at a reduced 
price; 20% said they would throw it away; and 4% said they would grind it and use it as 
animal feed. Two other studies mention the mixing of different maize qualities and the 
grinding of rotten maize for animal feed, as practices commonly used in this food chain 
(IFPRI, 2010; Kang’ethe, 2011). 
In line with previous findings, more than half of the sample stated that for own 
household consumption they preferred to grow their own maize, and among these traders 
almost all of them (93%) stated that the reason for this was the good quality of 
homegrown maize. This stands in sharp contrast with only 20% of the sample that 
preferred to get maize from their own business for own household consumption. This 
provides more evidence of the existence of a widespread belief—even among traders—
that maize available for purchase is of lower quality than homegrown maize. Also, 
contrary to what was expected, three quarters of the surveyed traders said they preferred 
to buy maize for own household use from their own province; and this was particularly 
true for traders in the Eastern province—the area with the highest aflatoxin contamination 
rates in the country—, 92% of whom reported preferring to buy maize from the Eastern 
province for their families’ consumption. This could be explained by the lack of 
awareness of the prevalence and geographical spread of aflatoxin contamination in the 
country, as well as by the subjective belief that local produce ought to be of better 
quality.   
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Turning to unobservable maize characteristics, three quarters of traders in the 
sample gave a reasonably accurate explanation of what aflatoxin is, but only 17% linked 
aflatoxin to maize moisture, thus showing a generally weak understanding of what factors 
cause these toxins.
28
 Half of the sample knew what a moisture meter is but only 16% 
knew the maize moisture content regulation. Thirty seven percent of traders had ever seen 
somebody use a moisture meter, confirming that the majority of these traders were selling 
retail to individuals rather than to formal sector buyers.  
Maize samples were purchased from the surveyed traders. These were obtained 
from six different points inside traders´ large maize bags using a probe, in order for the 
sample to be representative of the whole bag. These maize samples were tested for 
moisture content using a calibrated maize grain moisture meter. The meter used was a 
resistance moisture meter, which is the type that requires a ground sample of maize and 
measures the kernel’s external and internal levels of moisture, and is therefore believed to 
be more accurate (USAID, 2011). The moisture content recorded for each maize sample 
was the average of three different readings, making the moisture content recorded more 
precise. Table 3 shows the moisture content of 353 maize samples, grouped in percent 
moisture ranges. Only 15% of the maize samples were below the regulated level of 
13.5% moisture content, and more than a third of the samples had more than 15% 
moisture content. This confirms the lack of enforcement of this regulation in the informal 
markets. Further, the sampled maize moisture content distribution shows that the maize 
bags that were auctioned had moisture content in the moisture ranges that traders in this 
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 Traders´ own definitions of aflatoxin that included terms such as “moldy grains”, “rotten 
grains”, “poisonous maize” or “maize not well dried” were considered accurate responses.  
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study were used to having in their own maize.
29
 Given that the Eastern province is a high 
aflatoxin risk area, it was of particular interest to check if the distribution of moisture 
content test results from maize samples procured in this region showed a higher 
proportion of high-moisture samples. However, Table 3 shows that the fraction of 
samples procured in the Eastern province that are above the recommended level is as high 
as in the other regions (even slightly smaller).   
 
Table 3: Moisture content in traders’ maize samples  
 
 
In order to assess whether moisture content had any effect on maize price, traders’ 
asking prices at the time of the study were regressed on the moisture content of the 
samples taken from maize they had for sale. Separate regressions were run for the 1KG 
and 90KG asking prices, in order to assess whether the retail price was more sensitive to 
differences in quality, given that customers might find it easier to assess the quality of a 
1KG bag than a 90KG bag. Also, separate regressions were run by season in which the 
data collection took place at the trader’s market: lean season or harvest season. The four 
regressions were run using market fixed effects to account for the large variation in prices 
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 No correlation was found between moisture content in traders´ maize and their transportation, 
sorting and drying practices. Given that we only have one observation of traders´ maize moisture 
content and that traders were not asked specifically about their practices in connection with the 
maize that was sampled, it was not surprising to find no correlation between these two.  
# Samples % # Samples %
Below 13.5% 54 15% 22 19%
Between 13.5 and 15% 171 48% 58 50%
Between 15 and 17% 104 29% 33 29%
Above 17% 24 7% 2 2%
TOTAL 353 100% 115 100%
All Only Eastern 
% Moisture Content Range
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across markets. Table 4 shows the results. Moisture content does not have a significant 
effect on either the 1KG or 90KG maize price during the lean season. However, moisture 
content has a negative effect on price during the harvest season, only significant at 10% 
level and for the 90KG asking price. It is reasonable to expect that when maize is more 
abundant during the harvest season, buyers might be more selective and hence penalize 
more humid maize. This result shows that price penalties—when they exist—are more 
sensitive to quality in the season of abundance of grain, and coincides with what was 
found by Jones et al. (2014) in informal dry bean markets in Rwanda. Still, the lack of a 
significant effect of moisture content on price in most of the cases analyzed in Table 4 
provides evidence of the weak observability of moisture content in this setting, which 
potentially prevents traders from obtaining a premium for offering dryer maize.  
 




90KG Price 1KG Price 90KG Price 1KG Price
Moisture Content (%) 1.27 0.16 -8.57* 0.01
(15.11) (0.22) (4.59) (0.13)
Constant 3,634*** 42.95*** 2,838*** 34.49***
(222.24) (3.28) (70.74) (2.02)
Observations 241 239 114 115
Number of Markets 6 6 3 3
Market fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.031 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Lean Season Harvest Season
49 
 
3.4.2 Impact of information on willingness to pay 
Table 5 presents summary statistics of traders’ bids by type of maize bag, for the 
309 traders (84% of the sample) that were subject to the “moisture information 
treatment” (MIT). The average bids for low moisture maize, both without label and with 
label (A and B), are higher than the average bids for medium moisture maize bags (C and 
D), which in turn are higher than the average bids for high moisture maize bags (E and 
F). This suggests that traders are able to assess maize moisture content with their own 
methods when no information is provided (A, C and E): the average bid decreased as the 
level of moisture content increased. Also, traders seem to trust the information provided 
to them through the labels, and to adjust their bids accordingly. When information on 
moisture content was provided for the low moisture level maize (B)—the only lot that 
complied with the regulation—the average bid was higher than when no information was 
provided (A); and when information on moisture content was provided for the medium 
and high moisture levels (bags D and F, which did not comply with the regulation), the 
average bids were lower than when no information was provided. Table 5 also shows the 
percentage of traders that bid zero for each of the maize bags. Almost none of the traders 
did so in the low and medium levels of moisture content, and around a quarter of the 
sample bid zero for the high moisture content pair of bags (E and F), again providing 
evidence of both the ability of traders to assess moisture content to some extent and their 






Table 5: Summary statistics of traders’ bids by maize bag type in the MIT 
  
 
To check whether bids for the auctioned maize were consistent with traders’ market 
behavior, average bids were calculated by market and compared with average 90KG 
prices recently paid for maize purchased by the surveyed traders in each market. The 
average prices paid for 90KG bags were estimated using the most recent purchase made 
in the same month that the survey was conducted, to minimize the impact of seasonality 
on prices. The average prices paid were also calculated using the last 3 purchases made in 
the same month that the survey was conducted, and the results were almost identical (not 
included in Table 6). In order to calculate an average bid per market that could be 
compared with the average price paid, the average bids for each unlabeled bag in the 3 
moisture ranges were weighted by the proportion of tested maize samples in each of these 
moisture ranges in each market. The difference between prices and bids is small and not 
significant, with the overall average bid approximately 7% below the average price paid 
in the last purchase of maize, and as little as 3% below in one of the markets (Table 6). 
This provides confidence that traders did see the auction as a real opportunity to purchase 
maize, similar to buying it from other sellers, and hence their bids expressed their true 



















Mean (KSh) 2,867 2,945 2,702 2,634 1,940 1,887
Std Deviation (KSh) 548 543 587 638 1,129 1,167
Median (KSh) 3,000 3,100 2,900 2,900 2,200 2,400
% 0 bid 1% 1% 2% 2% 22% 25%
# Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309






Table 6: Average bids compared to average prices paid for purchased maize, by market 
 
 Meru Eldoret Bungoma Chuka Kitale  Webuye Kisii Kisumu Machakos Average
Bids bag A - low moisture unlabeled (KSh) 3,246 3,139 2,355 2,974 2,169 2,356 3,300 2,978 3,204 2,858
Bids bag C - medium moisture unlabeled (KSh) 3,099 2,948 2,111 2,778 2,064 2,205 3,114 2,853 3,061 2,693
Bids bag E - high moisture unlabeled (KSh) 2,615 2,678 1,773 1,687 1,383 1,283 2,414 1,976 2,060 1,985
Weighted average bids (KSh)¹ 3,090 2,831 2,077 2,783 2,052 2,192 3,189 2,836 3,109 2,684
90KG price paid in most recent purchase (KSh)² 3,185 3,187 2,211 2,975 2,274 2,400 3,448 3,030 3,400 2,901
Difference (price - bid, KSh) 95 356 134 192 222 208 259 194 291 217
Difference (% of price paid) 3% 11% 6% 6% 10% 9% 8% 6% 9% 7%
¹ Average bids for A, C and E in each market w ere w eighted by the proportion of maize samples in each moisture range among each market's total tested maize samples
² Month of purchase coincides w ith month in w hich bids w ere made
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Table 7 presents the same summary statistics as Table 5, but for the 62 traders 
(16% of the sample) that were exposed to the “aflatoxin information treatment” (AIT). 
Again, providing maize quality information, in this case about its compliance with the 
aflatoxin regulation (bags G and H), increased traders’ average bids both in the low and 
medium moisture ranges; and bids decreased as the moisture content range increased.   
 
Table 7: Summary statistics of traders’ bids by maize bag type in the AIT 
 
 
In order to assess the impact of the provision of quality information on traders’ 
willingness to pay for maize, traders’ bids were regressed on a binary variable indicating 
whether or not maize quality information (moisture content at different ranges and 
compliance with the aflatoxin regulation) was provided. The results are shown in Table 8. 
Linear regressions were run with and without trader fixed effects, and using robust 
standard errors. The first six columns in Table 8 correspond to the MIT, and each of the 
three pairs of columns shows the impact of moisture content information on traders’ 
willingness to pay for maize of a given moisture level (low, medium and high). The 
results are presented separately for each moisture content range because the impact of 
















Mean (KSh) 2,918 3,098 2,746 2,938 2,287
Std Deviation (KSh) 410 427 442 442 861
Median (KSh) 3,000 3,200 2,900 3,000 2,500
% 0 bid 0% 0% 0% 0% 10%
# Observations 62 62 62 62 124





depending on whether moisture is above or below the regulated level, and also because 
the value of increasing precision of information on this attribute may differ over its range. 
The last four columns in Table 8 correspond to the AIT. 
Providing information on moisture content has a significant impact on traders’ 
valuation of maize, as long as maize is not extremely wet. Traders were willing to pay 
around KSh 80 (around USD 0.87) more for maize that was labeled as having moisture 
content below the regulatory standard, compared to the same quality maize for which no 
moisture information was provided. This result is significant at a 1% level. The KSh 80 
amount represents approximately 13% to 19% of the margin traders earn on a 90KG bag 
(depending on whether it´s sold wholesale or retail).
30
  
Labeling maize as having moisture content just above the regulated level (between 
14 and 15%) decreased traders’ bids by KSh 68. On the other hand, informing traders of 
considerably high moisture content in maize (between 17% and 19%) did not seem to 
significantly influence their willingness to pay, presumably because when maize is very 
moist traders are able to assess that it exceeds the regulatory standard using rudimentary 
methods, so more precise information is of little value. 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Traders´ average markup per bag was estimated for each market using traders´ asking prices for 
own maize on sale at the time of the interview, and the prices paid for 90KG bags bought in the 
last purchases that were made in the same month as the interview. Given that traders in the 
sample store maize for less than 3 weeks on average, it is reasonable to assume that maize for sale 
had been purchased recently and hence the prices paid by traders and asking prices in the same 
month can be used to calculate an estimation of the gross margin per bag. The average markup, 
estimated in this way, was between KSh 420 and KSh 625 per bag, depending on whether the bag 
was sold wholesale or retail in 1 or 2KG units. These estimates are in line with the only similar 
estimate that could be found in the literature: Kirimi et al. (2011) state that maize assemblers’ 
profits are in the range of KSh 130 to KSh 520 per bag. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Information provided through label 79.5*** 79.4*** -68.4** -68.4** -53.6 -53.6 180.3*** 176.7*** 190.4*** 190.3***
(15.84) (15.89) (24.69) (24.77) (51.21) (51.38) (17.8) (18.48) (23.01) (23.87)
Education 2.49 13.78 10.12 -18.69 -28.26**
(15.212) (8.763) (22.767) (13.133) (11.432)
Experience 4.21 7.71 -1.06 20.37 9.85
(5.947) (6.1) (16.365) (12.841) (12.932)
In contact with formal buyers -107.33 -78.97 300.28 -182.35 -97.29
(87.372) (115.99) (168.711) (180.954) (218.21)
Low quality maize is fed to livestock or sold to feed producers 83.25 55.38 488.95*** 112.55 180.44*
(143.594) (155.211) (134.384) (92.237) (93.054)
Constant 2,896*** 2,852*** 2,730*** 2,558*** 1,965*** 1,799*** 2,926*** 2,938*** 2,753*** 2,908***
(7.921) (276.615) (12.348) (195.747) (25.606) (196.302) (8.900) (205.891) (11.504) (220.557)
Fixed Effects (traders) Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610 122 120 122 120
Number of traders 305 305 305 61 61
R-squared 0.115 0.016 0.043 0.015 0.011 0.032 0.601 0.13 0.550 0.105
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
*** Signif icant at 1%, ** signif icant at 5%, * signif icant at 10%
Low Moisture Medim Moisture High Moisture
Aflatoxin Free - Low 
Moisture





The control variables included in the specifications without fixed effects relate to 
traders’ background and experiences in the maize business: years of formal education; 
years of experience in the maize trading business; an indicator variable that captures 
those who have had contacts with formal buyers (such as NCPB and large millers); and 
an indicator variable that captures those who report selling their low quality maize to feed 
producers or feeding it to livestock.
31
 The latter variable is the only one that has a 
significant effect on traders’ willingness to pay and only in the high moisture case. 
Almost a third of the amount traders were willing to pay for the wettest maize is 
explained by whether they sell such maize to feed producers, who are known for 
accepting much lower quality maize.  
These results suggest that although traders are able to rank maize by moisture 
content, improving the observability of moisture content could strengthen the link 
between quality and price. This has the potential to affect upstream maize farming and 
handling practices and could thus lead to the production of a higher quality crop. This is 
particularly true given that these traders source mainly from farmers, so affecting traders’ 
incentives could have a direct influence on farmers. Furthermore, it would be reasonable 
to expect a much larger effect of information on traders selling on a larger scale and 
targeting buyers that do condition their purchases on passing a moisture content test.  
In the case of the AIT, the impact of information on traders´ willingness to pay was 
even stronger. Traders were willing to pay between KSh 177 and KSh 190 more for the 
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 Traders classified as having had contacts with formal buyers were those who fulfilled one or 
more of these conditions: having ever sold to a large miller or NCPB; at least 1 of the 3 largest 
purchases or sales in the last year involved a moisture meter; at least 1 of the largest 3 sales were 
made to a large miller or NCPB; reports selling high quality maize to a large miller or NCPB. 





bags of maize that were certified as complying with the aflatoxin regulation, compared to 
identical maize for which no information was provided. These amounts represent 
approximately 35% of the average margin earned on a 90KG bag. This shows that 
aflatoxin testing might be more valued by the market than moisture testing. This may 
reflect the high level of awareness about aflatoxin within this sample (74% of the sample 
could give a correct definition of what aflatoxin is), and traders’ general lack of 
familiarity with the moisture content regulation (only 16% of traders knew that 13.5% 
was the maximum moisture content allowed). Also, aflatoxin is harder to assess based on 
observable characteristics than is maize moisture content, so precise information on 
moisture content may be less valuable than information about aflatoxin contamination. 
The obvious question is why traders are willing to pay substantially more for better 
quality maize in unobservable attributes if there is no price premium for unobservable 
characteristics in this setting. There are four potential explanations for this result: 
switching from the informal to formal markets; own household consumption; the ability 
to charge a premium for safer maize, if only to particular consumers; and the certainty 
that the purchased maize has not had water added to fake higher grain weight.  
The first hypothesis, that traders aim to sell the higher quality maize to formal 
buyers, is unlikely in the study setting. Only 12% of the sample had ever sold to NCPB or 
a large miller, buyers which pay a premium for maize that complies with the regulatory 
moisture content standard. Further, there is a significant fixed cost of transport to access 
these markets, so having one bag of maize that complies with the moisture or aflatoxin 




The second possibility is that traders were planning to keep the high quality bags 
for own household consumption, instead of selling them as part of their business. After 
submitting their bids, traders were asked what they would do with the two low moisture 
bags (labeled for moisture and unlabeled) if they won them.
32
 In the case of the unlabeled 
bag (bag A), 5% answered that they would use it for own household consumption. This 
proportion increased to 9% when traders were asked about maize labeled as complying 
with the moisture content regulation (bag B). The majority answered that they would sell 
the bag at the market (87% and 80% for bags A and B, respectively), and the rest said 
they would either sell them to a school or a miller. In order to check if planning to use the 
low moisture maize for own household consumption had any influence on the results 
found, bids were regressed on a binary variable indicating that the trader planned to use 
either of the two low moisture bags for household consumption. Also, this binary variable 
was interacted with the low moisture information provision dummy, and the interaction 
together with its two components were regressed on traders’ bids for the low moisture 
bags. Table 9 shows two specifications: column 1 includes the indicator for planned 
household use and the interaction with the low moisture information provided, and 
column 2 includes trader fixed effects (so planned household use drops out and only the 
interaction term with information on moisture content remains). In the first specification, 
the planned use of maize for own consumption has a positive and significant effect on 
bids for the low moisture maize overall, but this effect is not any higher when maize is 
labeled for moisture content.   
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Table 9: Impact of information and planned HH consumption use on bids 
 
 
Another possibility is that traders may be able to sell higher quality maize for a 
premium, at least to some customers. Traders might be able to somehow advertise when 
their maize is of higher quality and thus charge a premium for it. Or they could sell it to 
repeat customers, as this may enhance their reputation for selling high quality maize. In 
the case of aflatoxin-certified maize, the result obtained is striking, as there is no way 
customers would be able to tell if maize was contaminated or not. It may be that traders, 
through repeated interactions with customers, have gained their trust and hence may be 
able to obtain a premium price or reputational advantage by sharing the information with 
customers that their maize is aflatoxin safe, despite this being an unverifiable claim.  
A final possible explanation relates to the fact that water is sometimes deliberately 
added to maize grains in these markets to increase grain weight (i.e. to profit from selling 
less grains per bag of a given weight). Therefore, purchasing a 90KG bag of maize grains 
(1) (2)
Information provided through label 81.3** 81.3***
(40.862) (13.437)
Planned household consumption 172.3***
(66.188)




Fixed Effects (traders) No Yes
Observations 600 600
Number of traders 300
R-squared 0.019 0.120
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





with certainty that it has a low level of moisture gives traders confidence that they have 
not been deceived by a reduced quantity of maize grains in a bag of an advertised weight.  
3.5 Conclusions 
This study was designed with the primary aim of investigating the potential of 
moisture content testing and labeling as an inexpensive way of encouraging traders to 
demand drier maize from their suppliers, most of who are farmers. If a price premium 
based on dryness could pass back to farmers, they would be encouraged to dry and store 
maize more carefully, or adopt new inputs such as biological-control products, which 
would contribute to reducing the risk of aflatoxin contamination.  
The results show that information on moisture content significantly affects traders’ 
willingness to pay and suggest the observability of moisture content is limited. Also, the 
effect of information does not appear to be driven by the possibility of selling drier maize 
to the formal sector, nor by the intention to keep the dryer maize for own household 
consumption. There appears to be potential for strengthening the price-quality 
relationship within the informal sector by improving information on moisture content. 
This could be implemented, for instance, by allowing traders to access moisture meters 
through agricultural extension services, or through a moisture meter rental scheme that 
would allow for one device to be used by all traders at each open-air market.  
This study also shows that the impact of providing traders with information on 
aflatoxin contamination is over twice as large as the effect of moisture content 
information, and therefore could have an even stronger effect on maize handling 
practices. While there currently exists no market for maize certified as aflatoxin-safe in 




value chain could potentially result in rewarding the traders who supply—and ultimately 
the farmers who produce—such maize with premium prices, increasing incentives to 
reduce contamination in the food supply. However, the current price of testing is likely a 
barrier. Creating a market for certified safe maize would require a comprehensive 
approach to the problem, as setting up an aflatoxin certification scheme would require not 
only finding a reasonably costly testing technology, but also establishing a credible 
public or third-party verification entity.  
The results of this study are particularly notable given that credible food labeling is 
generally not seen in informal markets of the type where the study took place, and where 
a vast majority of the poorest Kenyans purchase their food.  
A limitation of this study, which is shared by similar revealed-preference studies, is 
that while the incentive compatibility introduced by requiring traders to pay reduces 
potential bias, one-shot purchase decisions may not be representative of habitual 
willingness to pay (Hoffmann, 2009). Future studies should address this limitation by 
analyzing the dynamics of the demand for new products certified for food quality and 





Chapter 4: The impact of information on Kenyan consumers’ 




In most of the developing world, information on the nutritional and safety attributes 
of food is usually not available. Often, people in developing countries are not even aware 
of the damage that food they consume can do to their health. In other cases, even though 
they may be aware, they do not have the option of purchasing food with certainty that its 
consumption will not damage their health in the short or long run. An important question 
is whether they would be willing to pay a premium for food that is certified as safe to eat 
if it was made available to them.
34
 Given the low awareness of food safety threats and 
their health consequences, as well as the liquidity constraints that characterize poor 
populations, it is worth studying whether demand for safer food exists. What is more, as 
public health communication has low diffusion in these contexts, it is important to 
analyze whether the provision of relevant information could influence poor consumers’ 
food purchase decisions.  
The purchase of safe food can be thought of as a preventive health or health-
seeking behavior because safe food is an input in the production of health. In developing 
countries, households’ investment in preventive health care is low. Among the multiple 
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 This study was partly funded by resources (USD 2,000) from the Luther G. Tweeten 
Scholarship, awarded to the author by the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 
(AAEA) Trust.  
34
 It is sometimes argued that food safety should be a pre-competitive criterion, meaning that only 
safe food should be available for sale (Unnevehr and Hoffmann, 2015). However, in many 
developing countries that have many of their food value chains plagued with food hazards, going 
through a phase of food safety certification might be needed in order to create the right incentives 




reasons for this, the most studied in the development economics literature have been 
liquidity and credit constraints, time-inconsistent preferences, poor supply of preventive 
care and lack of information (Guyatt et al., 2002; Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Cohen and 
Dupas, 2010; Dupas, 2011b; Kremer and Glennerster, 2011; Bennear et al., 2013). The 
focus of this study is on the lack of information.   
The human capital model of the demand for health predicts that people will invest 
in preventive health if its marginal cost is less than the discounted sum of benefits from 
the lower probability of getting sick (Grossman, 2000). This implies that people should 
know the relevant health benefits of investing in safer food and be able to form their 
subjective probabilities of getting sick when a preventive health investment is made and 
when it’s not. In her review of the literature on preventive and curative health 
investments in developing countries, Dupas (2011b) makes the point that investment in 
prevention depends on the individual or household’s beliefs about the degree to which 
prevention could reduce the risk of negative shocks, and stresses that the information 
about health risks available to these decision-makers is therefore important.  
Several empirical studies in developing country settings have shown that providing 
relevant information can have large impacts on preventive health behaviors (Madajewicz 
et al., 2007; Jalan and Somanathan, 2008; Luoto et al., 2011; Dupas, 2011a; Dammert et 
al., 2014; Fitzsimons et al., 2014; Bennett et al., 2015). On the other hand, some studies 
found null or extremely modest impacts of certain types of health information on 
behavior (Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Dupas, 2009; Luo et al., 2012; Guiteras et al., 




information given—what to convey and how to communicate it—in order to encourage 
positive health behaviors (Bennear et al., 2013).  
Even assuming perfect access to information, it is still under debate how to model 
people’s learning process, in which prior beliefs and their updating mechanisms play an 
important role. Bayesian learning based on Bayesian updating rules is a useful framework 
to model this process. One of its implications is that the more surprising the information 
received, the larger the updating effect should be (Lybbert et al., 2007). However, there is 
some recent evidence in the literature that information processing may not be fully 
rational and may rely on the use of heurisitics, rather than Bayesian learning (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974; Kremmer and Glennerster, 2011). For example, if attention is a 
limited resource, there can be costs associated with the processing of information, and 
therefore more salient information may have a larger impact on behavior (Chetty et al., 
2009; Kremer and Glennerster, 2011; Luoto et al., 2011; Spears, 2014).   
The goal of this chapter is to explore whether the provision of health risk 
information can influence consumers’ demand for food labeled as safer to eat in a 
developing country setting. A field experiment to elicit revealed preferences for safer 
food was conducted in Kenya, where maize, the main staple crop, is highly contaminated 
with naturally-occurring aflatoxins that are harmful to human health. In Kenya, many 
people lack complete information about the safety of the maize they consume and the link 
between aflatoxin-contaminated maize and serious health hazards. Hence, this study aims 
to characterize consumers’ subjective beliefs regarding aflatoxin contamination rates, the 
level of awareness of aflatoxins’ health consequences, and how the provision of 




maize certified for its aflatoxin content was not available in the market, the experiment 
included the introduction of an aflatoxin-safe certified maize flour. 
As part of this field experiment, maize flour packages on sale at small retail shops 
were tested for aflatoxin, labeled as safe to eat when they complied with the aflatoxin 
regulation, and offered for sale for a few days at a 20% premium above untested maize 
price. Information messages were randomly varied across customers entering the shops 
who intended to buy maize flour, in order to assess the differential impact of these 
messages on demand for certified maize. Some customers received information on the 
consequences of consuming aflatoxin-contaminated food on children’s health; a second 
group received information on its impact on health in general; and two additional groups 
of customers received information on the prevalence of processed maize flour 
contamination with aflatoxin in the local area combined with the children’s health and 
general health consequences, respectively. This design allows estimation of the impact 
that different health messages have, as well as the additional impact of providing 
prevalence information, which is essential for the formation of subjective probabilities 
regarding food safety risks faced.   
This study has several policy implications. First, one prominent contamination 
reduction strategy currently being tested in Kenya is the use of biological-control 
products that, if proved effective and adopted by farmers, could substantially reduce 
maize contamination with aflatoxin.
35
 Therefore, evidence of sufficient willingness to pay 
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 The biological-control technology consists in the development of a natural product that uses the 
ability of native non-toxic strains of the aflatoxin-producing fungus to outcompete the toxic 
strains. This technology, widely used in the US, has been shown to reduce the aflatoxin 
production by over 80% with a single application in the US (Cotty, 2006). This biocontrol 
method has already been adapted for use in several African countries, including Kenya, and 




for the benefits such a technology would provide could incentivize value chain actors 
(farmers and millers) to adopt or require adoption of the new technology. Second, the 
impact that different information treatments may have on demand could be an important 
element for the design of effective communication and marketing strategies aiming to 
raise awareness and encourage demand for safer food. Finally, a broader contribution of 
the behavioral response obtained is that this information can be integrated in risk models 
to help determine the most cost-effective interventions in this area, a practice that is 
common for many natural resource and environmental problems (Hoffmann, 2010).  
 
4.2 Existing evidence: The impact of information on preventive health 
behavior 
 
Several studies have explored whether there exists demand for safer and more 
nutritious food in developing country contexts. Most of these studies have used stated 
preference methods and have found that consumers are willing to pay a premium for food 
with these characteristics (Ehmke, 2008; Krishna and Qaim, 2008; De Groote et al., 
2011; Ortega et al., 2011). However, as stated preference techniques can suffer from 
hypothetical bias that tends to inflate WTP (Lusk and Shogren, 2007), some authors 
believe the existing evidence based on these methods is not strong enough (Birol et al., 
2015). On the other hand, a few recent empirical studies using revealed preference 
methods have shown that consumers in developing countries are willing to pay a 
                                                                                                                                                 
contamination of maize was reduced between 67% and 99%, depending on the study (Atehnkeng 




premium for food certified as of higher quality or, specifically, as being safer to eat 
(Masters and Sanogo, 2002; Ifft et al., 2012; De Groote et al., 2016).  
Masters and Sanogo (2002)’s study involved designing a new product—a 
processed infant food labeled for its nutritional content—in order to assess mothers’ WTP 
for certification in Mali. Using a field experiment that required mothers to make several 
choices among different infant foods, Masters and Sanogo find that mothers’ WTP for 
certification is around 30% of the price of a can of a well-known branded infant food 
(about $1.75/kg) or four times the cost of certification. This shows that there exists a high 
WTP for information about the quality of infant food in this type of setting. 
In order to assess consumer valuation of safety labeling, Ifft et al. (2012) inserted a 
new product in a traditional market and offered discount coupons for either safety-labeled 
chicken or regular chicken. Ifft et al. find that consumers in Vietnam are willing to pay a 
10–15% premium per chicken purchased with a safety labeling that emphasizes safe 
production, processing, and transport conditions.  
De Groote et al. (2016) conducted experimental auctions using the Becker–
DeGroot–Maschak (BDM) mechanism to assess Kenyan rural consumers’ willingness to 
pay (WTP) for maize grains tested and labeled for aflatoxin safety.
36
 The authors estimate 
a price premium for the labeled safe grains between 25% and 50%, depending on the area 
of the country.  
The present study shares with these three studies the feature that a new product was 
introduced in order to assess the value of food safety or quality labels for consumers, 
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 The BDM mechanism consists in having a participant make a bid that is compared to a 
randomly generated number. If the bid is higher than the random number, the participant buys the 
good at a price equal to that random number. If the bid is below the random number, he pays 




showing that products carrying basic food safety or nutrition information are not readily 
available in poor countries’ markets.  
Additionally, some studies have tested whether providing consumers in developing 
countries with information about the importance of food quality or safety—on top of the 
information provided through food labels—encourages them to opt for safer or more 
nutritious food. However, the evidence is thin and inconclusive: while De Groote et al. 
(2016) find that providing information decreases the impact on WTP for safer food, 
Naico and Lusk (2010) and Birol et al. (2015) find the opposite result. 
De Groote et al. (2016) show that providing rural households with information 
about aflatoxin’s health consequences decreases their WTP for labeled maize. Because of 
the similarities with the present study, it is worth highlighting the differences between the 
two studies. De Groote et al. conducted experimental auctions using a BDM process at 
the household level—hence creating an artificial transaction setting—to assess 
consumers’ WTP for safety-labeled maize grains and the impact of information on their 
WTP. In contrast, the present study uses a real market setting and real purchases to 
estimate the influence of information on purchase decisions. What is more, estimating the 
impact of providing relevant information to consumers is not the main focus of De 
Groote et al.’s study. The authors test the influence on households’ bids of reading a 
message about what aflatoxin is and its health consequences, whereas the present study 
tests the influence of providing different types of health consequences and risk 
prevalence information.
37
 Further, De Groote et al.’s study is focused on rural consumers 
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 The message read as part of De Groote et al.’s study explained that aflatoxins are poisonous 
byproducts of common soil molds that grow on maize plants and grains where they can produce 




and on maize grains, whereas the current study focuses on urban consumers and 
packaged maize flour, which is usually purchased by urban households that are not the 
poorest.  
Naico and Lusk (2010) conducted a choice experiment in Mozambique to assess 
consumers’ WTP for orange-fleshed sweet potatoes, which are richer in vitamin A 
relative to traditional white varieties.  The study shows that participants who received 
information about the nutritional value of orange-fleshed sweet potatoes had a higher 
WTP for this nutritionally-enhanced crop. In line with this finding, Birol et al. (2015) 
conclude that Indian supermarket customers who received information through flyers that 
explained the benefits of GlobalGAP certified grapes were significantly more likely to 
purchase them.   
A few of the reviewed studies investigate the influence of prior awareness about 
food safety risk on consumers demand for safer food, and they find that greater 
awareness has a positive influence on demand. Using a contingent valuation method, 
Krishna and Qaim (2008) find that urban Indian consumers who already believed that 
pesticide residues had a relatively higher risk for human health had a higher WTP for 
organic vegetables. Ortega et al. (2011) also find—using a choice experiment—that 
urban Chinese consumers with relatively higher levels of food safety concern had higher 
WTP for pork certified as safer to eat. Birol et al. (2015) also find a similar result: Indian 
consumers with higher food safety consciousness prior to the study and who received 
food safety information had a higher probability of buying safely-produced grapes.  
                                                                                                                                                 
level exposure can lead to liver cancer, immune system disorders, stunted growth in children, and 





When it comes to the influence of information on preventive health behavior in 
general (aside from food quality and safety), there are several randomized evaluations 
that provide evidence that the lack of information might be hindering households’ 
investment in preventive health. Madajewicz et al. (2007) show that providing 
Bangladeshi households with information of the arsenic concentration in their well water 
in a binary format—below or above the national safety threshold—increased the 
probability of their switching to a safe well. Similarly, Jalan and Somanathan (2008) 
conclude that informing households in an Indian city of the concentration of fecal 
bacteria in their drinking water increased the use of water-purification techniques. 
Several studies have shown that the amount, type and framing of health risk 
information given affect risk perceptions and behavior. Luoto et al. (2011) study 
household demand for point-of-use (POU) water treatment technologies in rural Kenya 
and find that providing information about the contamination status of the community’s 
water sources led to increased preventive behavior (use of POU products), whereas the 
additional provision of information of the household’s own water quality had no further 
effect. This finding contradicts the idea that more salient messages that give more 
personalized information should have a bigger impact on health behaviors. The authors 
also find that using health messages with a contrast framing—highlighting the 
importance of the preventive behavior in both avoiding disease and improving health—as 
opposed to a positive framing alone increased POU product adoption rates.   
The studies by Dupas (2011a) and Duflo et al. (2011) also show that people 
respond to certain types of information, while not to others. Both studies conclude that a 




abstinence until marriage did not reduce teenage girls’ risky behavior. But Dupas (2011a) 
finds that providing Kenyan teenage girls with information on relative risks of 
contracting HIV depending on the type of partner had a large impact on the reduction of 
adolescents’ childbearing rate and unsafe cross-generational sex. This shows that it might 
be more effective to give comprehensive risk information together with prevention 
messages that provide alternative safer behaviors in order to encourage investment in 
preventive health.  
Dammert et al. (2014) study the effectiveness of mobile phone messages in 
fostering households’ preventive measures against dengue. They find that households that 
received 30 messages over a period of three months before the peak of the dengue season 
had a higher probability of taking preventive measures and lower objective measures of 
dengue risk transmission. The authors compare these positive results with the ones 
obtained by similar studies that also find positive effects on preventive health behavior 
after providing health-related information over many months; and they contrast these 
results with other experimental studies that find smaller effects when information is 
provided only once, such as in the case of Dupas (2009). Further, the authors find no 
message framing effects on health behavior, after having tried different sets of text 
messages that highlighted different aspects of prevention (e.g. monetary framing, gains vs 
losses framing).  
Bennett et al. (2015) show that a microscope demonstration session that allowed 
individuals in rural Pakistan to see microbes, together with a conventional hygiene 
instruction session, significantly increased the impact of hygiene information alone. The 




were exposed to both sessions and argue that the possibility of corroborating the 
existence of microbes could be adding credibility (i.e. precision) to the hygiene 
information received. They also show that the intervention had a smaller impact on those 
who adhered to traditional medicine, which may indicate prior beliefs in opposition to the 
germ theory of disease, thus limiting the impact of health risk information.  
There is some evidence that very detailed information can be ineffective at 
promoting preventive health behavior. While Madajewicz et al. (2007) conclude that 
providing simple binary safe/unsafe information had a positive impact on a preventive 
health behavior (switching to safe water sources), Bennear et al. (2013) find that, in a 
similar setting, receiving richer information on the relationship between arsenic exposure 
and arsenic risk had a negative but insignificant impact on the probability of switching to 
a safer source of water, i.e., wells with lower levels of arsenic contamination.  
On the other hand, some authors find that the provision of information does not 
promote the adoption of effective preventive health technologies and practices. Kremer 
and Miguel (2007) find that an intensive health education intervention implemented 
through schools in Kenya had no effect on children behaviors to prevent infection with 
intestinal worms (e.g. hand washing, wearing shoes, etc.). Further, Dupas (2009) shows 
that neither of two message framing options used affected households’ take up of a 
preventive health product (insecticide-treated bednets) in rural Kenya. Some households 
received a message that highlighted malaria´s morbidity and mortality, while others 
received a message that emphasized financial gains from preventing malaria. 
The evaluation of a childhood anemia prevention program in rural China supports 




prevention had very little impact on children’s anemia status or blood hemoglobin 
concentration, except when the information was combined with free iron supplements 
given daily to children at school. Also, Guiteras et al. (2016) show that none of several 
messaging treatments tested—standard health benefits, disgust message and shame 
message—had a substantial impact on hand washing, water chlorination or willingness to 
pay for chlorine or water treatment hardware at the end of a free trial of chlorine 
dispensers in Bangladeshi slums. The authors infer that budget constraints and 
convenience are barriers to preventive behavior that cannot be overcome through 
promotion or education alone.  
All these studies that find small or null effects of the provision of health-risk 
information show that in developing country settings the lack of information might not be 
the only constraint hindering households’ investment in preventive health.  
Most of the randomized evaluations cited above have focused on health hazards 
that have a short run impact on health, such as bacterial water contamination and 
mosquito-borne infectious diseases (malaria and dengue). The present study deals with 
aflatoxin contamination, which in general has a much longer-run effect on health, so 
benefits from preventive behavior can only be seen (if at all) in the long run. In this way, 
avoiding exposure to aflatoxin is similar to avoiding arsenic in drinking water, preventing 
anemia in children, and preventing infection with intestinal worms, for which the studies 
cited above indicate the impact of information on behavior is mixed.  
This research also shares with several previous studies the fact that risk prevalence 
information was provided (Jalan and Somanathan, 2008; Dupas, 2011a; Luoto et al., 




adoption of preventive health practices. Therefore, these two defining characteristics of 
the experiment conducted in this study—focusing on a long term health hazard and 
providing risk prevalence information—could create opposing forces on information 
processing and, ultimately, on behavior change.  
4.3 Context 
Kenya is among the countries in the world with the highest rates of aflatoxin 
exposure (Liu and Wu, 2010). Estimates of aflatoxin contamination of maize vary by site 
and year.Recent studies have found high levels of aflatoxin contamination in maize 
grains and maize flour in different areas of Kenya. Moser and Hoffmann (2015) found 
that 26% of around 900 maize flour packages on sale at shops in eight different towns in 
eastern and central Kenya did not meet the national standard for aflatoxin contamination. 
A study of maize grains contamination with aflatoxin conducted in 2010 in eastern 
Kenya—where aflatoxin contamination is most prevalent—found that 39% of 1500 
samples had aflatoxin levels above the maximum legal limit (Mutiga et al., 2014). The 
maize samples were collected from people who brought their maize for grinding at small 
local mills. The contamination rate varied from 22% to 60%, depending on the district, 
showing the high variability across the country. Another study, conducted in a different 
part of the country that is less affected by aflatoxin (western Kenya), found that 15% of 
milled maize samples also collected from small mills’ clients had aflatoxin contamination 
levels above the regulatory limit (Mutiga et al., 2015).  
More than a decade ago, a survey conducted in 2004—after an aflatoxicosis 
outbreak—in 65 markets located in eastern Kenya found that 55% of the sample of 350 




time), 35% had levels above 100 ppb, and 7% had levels above 1,000 ppb (Lewis et al., 
2005).  
Chronic aflatoxin exposure is linked to three human health problems: liver cancer, 
child stunting and immune system suppression. The most studied and documented 
disease linked to chronic aflatoxin exposure is liver cancer (Strosnider et al., 2006). There 
is vast evidence of the significant role of aflatoxin in the worldwide liver cancer burden. 
Liu and Wu (2010) show that between 5% and 28% of all liver cancer cases can be linked 
to aflatoxin-contaminated food and 40% of these cases are concentrated in Africa. Using 
a different methodology, Liu et al. (2012) obtained a similar estimate: 23% of liver 
cancer cases annually around the world can be attributable to aflatoxins. Additionally, 
aflatoxin has also been linked to impaired growth in children (Gong et al., 2002, 2003 
and 2004; Khlangwiset et al., 2011) and immune system disorders (Turner et al., 2003; 
Jiang et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2008). 
Even though there are a few studies that report consumer awareness levels about 
the presence of aflatoxin in Kenyan maize, very little is known about the awareness of the 
specific health risks associated with aflatoxin. A survey of 1500 maize consumers from a 
sample of 112 villages across Kenya’s high-aflatoxin-prevalence Eastern region shows 
that only half of the consumers had heard of aflatoxin and 42% believed it was harmful to 
human health (Hoffmann et al., 2013). This study shows that when asked to compare 
homegrown maize with maize purchased from traders, only 20% of consumers believed 
that their own maize could make them sick, compared to 93% in the case of purchased 
maize. Further, De Groote et al.’s (2016) study conducted in rural Kenya in 2010-2011—




heard about aflatoxin, but only 16% knew that aflatoxins can cause health problems. 
These numbers show that there exists some level of awareness of the linkage between 
contaminated maize consumption and health problems, but the specific health problems 
perceived to be associated with aflatoxin have not been explored.  
The maximum aflatoxin content allowed in maize by Kenyan regulatory standards 
is 10 parts per billion (ppb). However, this regulation is not enforced in the informal 
markets and weakly enforced in the formal market, where only part of the maize that is 
purchased and converted into flour by large millers is tested for aflatoxin and rejected 
when found to be contaminated. Kirimi et al. (2011) state that corruption exists at large 
millers, particularly at the level of gate security and quality testing. Hence, when facing a 
maize purchase, consumers cannot tell if it is contaminated with aflatoxin, not even when 
they purchase maize flour packages at shops and supermarkets (Moser and Hoffmann, 
2015).  
4.4 Project and Data 
Over three months in 2013, customers were interviewed and subjected to 
randomly-assigned information treatments prior to entering small retail shops in four 
urban or peri-urban towns in the Eastern and Nairobi provinces, Kenya. The same 
customers were also interviewed on their way out of the shops to record their maize 
purchase decisions. Participants were not told that they would be interviewed a second 
time until they had completed shopping. The sample consists of 349 customers recruited 
at the four study sites (Table 1). Two of these shops (in Machakos and Nairobi) are small 




Chuka); and the last one is a medium-sized supermarket (in Nairobi).
38
 The period of 
time spent surveying customers at each shop ranged between three days and slightly more 
than two weeks.  
 
Table 1: Vendors’ location, type and number of customers interviewed 
 
 
Before conducting the surveys, maize flour packages from the most popular brands 
at each shop were tested for aflatoxin using rapid aflatoxin test strips, which are easy to 
use in the field and produce quick results.
39
 Those packages of flour that complied with 
the aflatoxin regulation (aflatoxin content below 10 ppb) had labels affixed that said that 
the flour was aflatoxin tested and compliant with the regulation, and were placed on the 
shelves, together with the regular untested packages. Approximately one quarter (23%) of 
the tested maize flour was contaminated and thrown away.
40
 On average, seven different 
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 The difference between a duka and a mini-market is that the former has the merchandise on 
sale behind the owner’s counter, so it’s the owner who grabs the goods that customers decide to 
buy. At mini-markets customers can walk through the aisles and grab goods by themselves.  
39
 The rapid aflatoxin tests used (Agrastrip
TM
) are produced by Romer Labs and are an 
FDA/GIPSA approved method for testing maize. 
40
 The contamination rate (23%) was obtained from a sample of 346 tested flour packages that 
were purchased at the 4 stores where the experiment was conducted. 78 of these packages tested 
above 10 ppb for aflatoxin.  
Vendor Location Province Type Month visited # Days visited # Customers
1 Machakos Eastern Small supermarket Jul-13 9 78
2 Nairobi Nairobi Small supermarket Aug-13 15 124
3 Chuka Eastern Duka Sep-13 17 121





brands were tested and labeled per shop. The labeled packages were priced with a 20% 
premium above the price of the corresponding brand of untested maize flour.
41
  
Before entering the shops, customers were asked if they were planning to buy 
maize flour and if they gave a positive answer, a brief explanation of the study was given 
to them and those who agreed to participate were interviewed.
42
 The questions asked 
were related to awareness about aflatoxin contamination and maize flour quality more 
broadly. After answering the questions, customers were told that a new product had been 
introduced at the shop that day, which consisted of packaged maize flour tested for the 
contaminant aflatoxin. It was emphasized to customers that the regular non-tested version 
was still available, so they could buy either the tested maize flour or the regular non-
tested flour. 
After this, customers were randomly assigned to different information treatments. 
Approximately one quarter of the sample was read a message that highlighted the long-
run health risks to children of consuming aflatoxin-contaminated food. The message, to 
which I refer as the “child health message”, read:  
“Scientific studies have shown that children who are fed frequently with 
food that is contaminated with aflatoxin, such as maize flour, may be more 
vulnerable to disease, and may not grow as well as other children”.  
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 This price premium was chosen based on a pilot study using a similar method to test demand 
for certified maize at various price points. The pilot showed that 53% of consumers purchased 
tested flour offered at a 20% price premium. Purchase rates at lower price levels were close to 
100%, raising the concern that variation in purchase behavior at price premiums below 20% 
would be too low to detect the impact of messages.    
42
 The enumerator described himself to customers as part of a team of researchers from a 





Another quarter of the sample was read a script that stressed the general long-run 
health consequences of consuming aflatoxin-contaminated food. This “general health 
message” read:  
“Scientific studies have shown that frequently eating aflatoxin-
contaminated food, such as maize flour, may cause people to develop liver 
cancer and also make them more vulnerable to disease in general”.  
Another quarter of the sample was read the child health message and a 
“contamination message” with information about the local prevalence of aflatoxin 
contamination. Because it was essential to communicate the risk level in a way that was 
easily understood by customers whose literacy level could be relatively low, special 
thought was given to the way in which contamination rates would be explained. The 
contamination message read:  
“Maize contamination with aflatoxin in certain Kenyan regions is quite 
common. Last month, we performed some tests on maize flour of different 
brands at several shops like this one in this area. We found that 25% of 
the tested maize flour for sale is contaminated with aflatoxin. This means 
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 The 25% contamination rate was estimated as part of a larger study on demand for certified 
maize that took place during the three months previous to the beginning of this study. The 
estimated contamination rate was obtained from a sample of 555 tested flour packages that were 
purchased at seven different shops located in towns in the Eastern and Nairobi provinces. The 




The last quarter of the sample received both the general health message and the 
contamination message. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of customers across 
information treatments. 
 
Table 2: Customers’ assignment to information treatments  
 
 
The enumerator stayed outside the shop while customers made their purchases, so 
customers would not feel observed. When customers came out of the shops, they were 
approached again by the enumerator, who conducted the exit survey. The exit 
questionnaire aimed to find out if they had ended up buying maize, what type of maize 
had been bought and the reasons for the choice made, and to obtain some basic socio-
economic characteristics from them. Further, in order to confirm what type of flour had 
been purchased, the enumerator asked customers to show him the maize bag(s) 
purchased.  
The fraction of customers in each treatment group that bought maize after entering 
the shops is shown in Table 2. On average, 94% of customers who said they were 
planning to buy maize when entering the shop ended up buying maize, which shows that 
the targeting of maize flour customers was good. Customers’ decision whether to end up 
buying maize or not—independent of the maize type chosen—could have been 
# % # %
Child health information 95 27% 90 95%
Child health + contamination information 90 26% 88 98%
General health information 83 24% 76 92%
Gral health + contamination information 81 23% 73 90%







influenced by the information treatment received. Table 2 shows that the decision to buy 
maize is slightly unbalanced: those who received the child health message ended up 
buying maize in a higher proportion than those who did not receive it (and this is 
significant at the 10% level). Therefore, the main outcome variable (whether to buy the 
certified option or not) is defined below for all customers who said they were planning to 
buy maize—independent of whether they actually bought or not—coding those who 
ended up not buying maize as if they had chosen the regular non-tested flour. 
 
4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows average socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed customers. 
Customers were primarily female (63%) and had relatively high levels of education: 96% 
had completed primary school, 66% had completed secondary school and 20% had 
completed post-secondary studies. Customers were on average in their early thirties and 
58% of them lived in households with children under the age of 10. The fact that, in an 
urban/peri-urban area, 57% of customers’ households grew maize shows how common it 
is for Kenyans to grow maize on their own plots to feed their families. Using principal 
component analysis, a wealth score was created that encompasses the household’s 
ownership of several assets: television, refrigerator, house, car/truck, electricity and gas 








Table 3: Average socio-economic characteristics in the sample, by treatment group and tests of difference in means between treatment 
groups 
 
Child Not Child Contam
Not 
Contam
Child vs. Not Contam vs. Not
Female (%) 349 63% 60% 67% 63% 63% 0.189 0.978
Age (# years) 309 33 33 34 32 35 0.247 0.024**
There are children in HH (%) 328 58% 63% 53% 60% 57% 0.099* 0.421
Completed primary school (%) 349 96% 97% 94% 96% 96% 0.103 0.919
Completed secondary school (%) 349 66% 68% 64% 67% 65% 0.364 0.609
Completed post secondary school (%) 349 20% 17% 23% 19% 21% 0.261 0.601
HH grows maize (%) 349 57% 60% 54% 59% 56% 0.476 0.936
Wealth score 349 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.163 0.492
Knowledge score 349 0.02 0.15 -0.13 0.14 -0.10 0.096* 0.162
Nonzero contamination prior (%) 349 23% 26% 20% 26% 20% 0.136 0.152
n 349 185 164 171 178
(1) Note that the child health message and the contamination information treatments were cross-cut. Thus, the union of the Child and Not Child groups
 constitute the whole sample, as do the union of the Contam and Not Contam groups.
(2) P-values are from separate linear regressions of each variable on the two message treatment indicators (child and contam) and vendor dummies.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
# Obs Mean




In order to assess balance across message treatments, mean consumer 
characteristics by group were calculated, and the p-values of the tests of difference in 
means between these were estimated for each characteristic (Table 3). The only 
significant difference across treatments at 5% level of significance is age: those 
customers who received the contamination message were younger than those who did not 
receive it. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the average difference is relatively small (two 
and a half years of age), so a priori it should not be a concern. Also, the proportion of 
customers with children in their households is significantly higher among those who 
received the child health message, but only at the 10% significance level. 
As part of the entry survey, and before receiving any information treatment, 
customers responded a series of questions that aimed to assess their baseline knowledge 
about aflatoxin’s effect on human health and the extent to which they incorrectly believed 
the toxin is observable. Customers’ prior knowledge could have an impact on purchase 
decisions independent of the information messages received. Table 4 presents means of 
the responses to these questions. It shows that 57% of the surveyed customers not only 
had already heard about aflatoxin but also knew that aflatoxin could make people sick. 
This relatively high level of awareness about the fact that aflatoxin is harmful for human 
health could be due to the fact that the sample was mostly urban and with relatively high 
education levels. De Groote et al. (2016) estimated that only 16% of the rural households 
surveyed as part of their study in Kenya knew that aflatoxins can cause health problems. 
In terms of ability to assess maize contamination, only around a third of the 
surveyed customers in the current study knew that aflatoxin cannot be detected by sight, 




Even fewer customers (21%) knew that it is possible that aflatoxin-contaminated flour 
does not make people sick when they consume it (i.e. aflatoxin consumption can have a 
chronic unnoticeable effect on human health). These answers show that even though 
urban Kenyans might have a broad idea about aflatoxin and it being harmful for humans, 
when it comes to more detailed information, the level of knowledge is low. With the 
answers to these four questions, a knowledge index was constructed using principal 
component analysis, to be used in the econometric analysis. Table 3 shows the mean 
value of the knowledge score and that it is higher among those who received the child 
health message (only at the 10% level of significance).  
 
Table 4: Previous knowledge about aflatoxin 
 
 
Given that only one statistical difference was found at the 5% level of 
significance—that represents a 5% of total possibilities—the balance across message 
treatments is good. Still, in order to control for any slight differences across treatment 
groups and to improve precision of the estimated treatment effects, the analysis presented 
below includes specifications in which the variables shown in Table 3 are included as 
controls.   
Know aflatoxin is harmful for human health 57%
Know aflatoxin contaminated flour can look fine 37%
Know aflatoxin contaminated flour can taste fine 25%






In order to find out how much customers knew about the specific health risks 
caused by aflatoxin exposure, before receiving any information customers were asked 
what they believed were the main two risks associated with aflatoxin contamination.
44
 
More than a quarter of the sample knew that aflatoxin can cause immediate sickness 
(dizziness, vomiting, etc.). However, the proportions of customers who knew that 
aflatoxin can cause death (14%), cancer (8%) and problems to children’s health (3%) 
were extremely low, confirming the low level of awareness about the specific risks that 
aflatoxin poses to human health.   
 
Table 5: Awareness about aflatoxin’s specific health risks 
 
 
Before receiving any of the information messages, customers were asked if they 
believed maize flour for sale at a shop like the one they were about to enter could be 
contaminated with aflatoxin. 23% of customers gave a positive answer, i.e., around a 
quarter of the sample had nonzero contamination priors (Table 3). This shows that there’s 
widespread unawareness about the high prevalence of aflatoxin contamination. After this, 
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 The survey questions did not ask for all possible health risks associated with aflatoxin, but 
about the main risk, followed by a second question asking about other possible risk. Therefore, 
the 23% of the customers that gave answers to both questions could have mentioned more than 
two risks if the question had been formulated differently. This wouldn’t have significantly 
changed the conclusions obtained from the data (i.e., awareness would still be low), but to avoid a 
possible bias in these answers it was decided not to use them in the econometric specifications 
below.  
Believe aflatoxin can cause death 14%
Believe aflatoxin can cause cancer or long term health problems 8%






customers were asked, out of 10 times that they bought maize flour at a shop like the one 
they were visiting that day, how many times they might purchase maize flour that was 
contaminated with aflatoxin. Around 40% of customers interviewed did not know the 
answer, mostly because they did not know what aflatoxin is. Around 40% of the 
customers who gave an answer believed that it was not possible to get contaminated flour 
at a local shop. What is more, 95% of those who gave an answer to this question had a 
subjective contamination probability that was below the 25% contamination rate 
estimated for this study and included in the contamination message. Table 6 presents the 
distribution of answers given by customers. The average subjective probability of flour 
contamination with aflatoxin is around 0.3%, well below the 25% maize flour 
contamination rate calculated for this study.
45
 These results reinforce that there is a large 
underestimation of the prevalence of aflatoxin in maize flour packages for sale among the 







                                                 
45
 This subjective contamination prevalence was calculated assuming that those customers who 
did not know the answer to the probability question—the majority of which did not know what 
aflatoxin is—had a 0% contamination prior. The argument is that people who have not heard 
about aflatoxin cannot believe there’s a positive probability of purchasing contaminated maize. 
Even leaving these customers out and calculating the subjective contamination prevalence only 
with those customers that either gave a zero or positive answer, the subjective contamination rate 
would reach 0.55%, still less than a percentage point and far below the 25% contamination rate 




Table 6: Customers’ subjective probabilities of maize contamination with aflatoxin 
 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Impact of the information messages 
The fact that 40% of the surveyed customers bought tested flour suggests a high demand 
level given that they had to pay a 20% price premium over regular untested flour. Table 7 
shows the share of customers who bought the tested flour in each of the information 
treatments. The highest proportion of customers who bought tested flour (46%) is among 
those who received the contamination message, and the lowest proportion (38%) is 
among those who received the general health message.  
 








# Customers % Customers
0 0% 142 41%
1 10% 45 13%
2 20% 10 3%
3 30% 6 2%
4 40% 2 1%
5 50% 2 1%
Does not know 142 41%
Total 349 100%
# % # % # %
Bought tested flour 140 40% 78 46% 77 42% 63 38%
Bought regular flour 209 60% 93 54% 108 58% 101 62%









Table 8 presents the most commonly mentioned reasons behind customers’ 
purchase decisions. Around three quarters of those who bought tested flour said they did 
so for safety reasons in general or concern about aflatoxin in particular. Other reasons for 
purchasing the tested flour were curiosity (14%) and believing it might taste better (7%). 
Half of the customers who decided instead to purchase the regular unlabeled maize flour 
indicated that this was because the price for tested flour was too high. The other main 
reasons for not buying the tested flour were trust in the regular brand (18%), having been 
sent to the shop with specific purchase instructions (9%) and not knowing what aflatoxin 
is (5%).         
 
Table 8: Reasons for buying tested and untested flour 
 
 
The dichotomous dependent variable Yij is the decision of customer i at vendor j 
whether to buy the certified maize flour or not (Yij=1 if certified flour is bought). Yij is a 
function of two indicator variables that reflect the treatment messages received, the child 
health message (CH) and the contamination message (CO). Yij is also explained by a 
Bought tested flour¹ 140 43%
Reason: worried about aflatoxin/safety 107 76%
Reason: curiosity/comparison 20 14%
Reason: taste 10 7%
Bought regular flour² 187 57%
Reason: price too high 97 52%
Reason: trusts regular brand 34 18%
Reason: sent to buy with specific instructions 17 9%
Reason: does not know what aflatoxin is 10 5%
¹ Other reason for buying certified: trust in test.
² Other reasons for buying regular: mistrust in test; not having enough money. 




vector of consumer and consumer’s household characteristics Xij, vendor fixed effects Vj 
and unobservable variables included in a spherical random disturbance uij. The base 
estimated regression is given by:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝑂𝑖𝑗  +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑗 +  𝜹𝑿𝒊𝒋 + 𝜽 ∑ 𝑉𝑗
3
𝑗=1
+  𝑢𝑖𝑗 
Those customers that ended up not buying maize were coded as if they had chosen 
the regular non-tested flour (𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 0), because they would eventually buy this type of 
maize, not the tested flour that could only be purchased that day at that specific shop. 
Omitting those customers who decided not to buy maize could lead to biased estimates of 
the messages’ impact through selection bias. 
Linear probability models (LPMs) were estimated in order to assess the impact of 
the different information treatments on customers' purchase behavior. Because LPMs 
violate the assumption of homoskedastic error terms, robust standard errors were used in 
all specifications. The choice of a LPM over a logit or probit model is based mainly on 
the fact that although logit and probit models are specifically designed to handle binary 
dependent variables, these procedures handle fixed effects poorly (Angrist and Pischke, 
2008). Also, the coefficients estimated by LPMs are already marginal effects and do not 
require any transformation as in the case of logit or probit estimations. 
Aside from the binary independent variables indicating the experimental 
treatments, interaction terms were included in some specifications to allow for possible 
non-additive effects. The variables included in the specifications with controls are: 
female (binary), age, three binary variables to show the level(s) of education completed 




grows maize (binary), whether there are children below 10 years old in the household 
(binary), the wealth score and the aflatoxin knowledge score. Also, all the specifications 
include vendor fixed effects, since assignment to treatment was stratified at the vendor 
level.  
Column 1 in Table 9 presents the simplest specification. The contamination 
message has a positive and significant effect on the decision to buy tested flour: it 
increases the probability of purchase by 10 percentage points relative to those who did 
not receive the contamination message. On the other hand, the child health message does 
not have a significant impact above the general health message. Receiving the 
contamination and child health messages together increases the expected probability of 
buying the labeled flour by 12 percentage points above the impact of the general health 
message alone (p<0.1), conditional on having the same values for the controls. 
Column 2 presents the same regression as column 1, but it includes control 
variables. The contamination message still has a positive and significant effect (10 
percentage points, p<0.05), almost identical to the one obtained without controls. When 
analyzing the sign and significance of the control variables, several interesting results 
emerge. Women do not seem to be more inclined than men to buy the certified option, 
nor does growing maize at home or having children in the household influence the 
decision. However, older customers have a significantly higher propensity to buy 
certified, with each additional year of age increasing the probability of buying tested flour 
by 0.6 percentage points. This was a surprising result that could guide the targeting of 




Also, having a higher level of education significantly increases the probability of 
buying certified: having completed secondary and post-secondary school increases 9.6 
percentage points (p<0.1) and 21 percentage points (p<0.05), respectively, the chance of 
opting for the labeled flour. Further, wealthier customers have a 4 percentage point 
higher chance of buying certified, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of 
the wealth index created. Customers who already knew before the experiment that 
aflatoxin is harmful for human health and how it can be assessed in maize, have a 7 
percentage point higher probability of buying certified flour. This could be due to prior 
knowledge increasing trust in the information received.   
 
Table 9: Impact of the different information treatments on buying certified flour (OLS) 
 
(1) (2)
Contamination message received 0.1036** 0.0996**
(0.048) (0.046)






Completed primary school 0.1014
(0.123)
Completed secondary school 0.0966*
(0.057)
Completed post-secondary school 0.2136***
(0.065)
HH grows maize -0.0825
(0.052)








Vendor fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 349 328
R-squared 0.170 0.333
Robust standard errors in parentheses





4.6.2 Influence of having children in the household 
The hypothesis tested here is that customers who live in households with children 
might find the child health message more relevant and hence it might have a stronger 
effect on their decision to buy the labeled alternative than on customers who do not live 
with children in their households. On the other hand, receiving the contamination 
message should not have a differential effect on customers who have children in their 
households.  
Table 10 shows the differential impact of the information treatments on those 
households that do and do not include children below 10 years old. Balance across 
treatment groups among households with and without children was checked through tests 
of difference in means for all the relevant baseline variables, and is presented in the 
appendix (Table A.1). Among households that included children, the proportion of 
female customers is 16 percentage points lower in the group that received the child health 
message (5% significance level). If women were more likely to invest in child health as 
some authors have shown (Duflo, 2003; Qian, 2008), we would expect that having fewer 
female customers in the child message group would only bias downward the 
estimated child message effect.  
Column 1 shows that without controls, customers whose households include 
children were not differentially affected by the child health message compared to those 
whose households do not include children. Receiving the contamination message has 
again a positive and significant estimated coefficient, and similar in value to the 
previously estimated ones. When controls are added to this specification (column 2), the 




have children becomes significant (p<0.05) and is above 18 percentage points. Column 3 
includes both messages (child health and contamination) interacted with customers 
having children in the household, but excludes control variables. In this case, none of the 
interaction effects are significant. Specification 4 includes both interactions, as well as 
the control variables. The additional effect of the child health message on customers who 
live with children is again significant and close to 18 percentage points. There is not 
sufficient statistical power to reject a null impact of the contamination message separately 
for those with and without children, though the value of the coefficient on this treatment 
remains similar to that estimated in models without the interaction, which itself has a 
coefficient close to zero (0.0257). Hence, these results present some evidence that the 
child health information provided had a differential impact on those who live with 
children in their households.  
 
Table 10: Differential impact of the information treatments on HHs with children (OLS)  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contamination message received 0.1129** 0.1006** 0.0840 0.0856
(0.051) (0.045) (0.080) (0.070)
Child health message received -0.0638 -0.0937 -0.0636 -0.0937
(0.079) (0.070) (0.079) (0.071)
Child health message X children in the HH 0.1549 0.1861** 0.1557 0.1867**
(0.103) (0.094) (0.103) (0.094)
Contamination message X children in the HH 0.0497 0.0257
(0.105) (0.092)
Children below 10 in the HH -0.0440 -0.0628 -0.0684 -0.0755
(0.078) (0.073) (0.093) (0.090)
Constant 0.6754*** 0.3209* 0.6877*** 0.3286*
(0.085) (0.189) (0.088) (0.194)
Controls Not included Included Not included Included
Vendor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 328 328 328 328
R-squared 0.149 0.341 0.150 0.342
Robust standard errors in parentheses





4.6.3 Influence of prior beliefs of aflatoxin contamination prevalence 
Consumers’ prior beliefs about the prevalence of aflatoxin contamination could 
also influence the impact of the contamination message on their purchase decisions. As 
was explained above, customers’ subjective probability of contamination was elicited, in 
10 percent increments. This is used to test the influence of prior beliefs about aflatoxin 
contamination risk on the impact of receiving new information about the local 
contamination prevalence. 
Following Lybbert et al. (2007) and Birol et al. (2015), a Bayesian learning process 
based on Bayes rule, could be summarized in the following equations: 
 
πi|c =  δiπi + ( 1 − δi)πc   =   πc +  δi(πi − πc)  
 
where πi|c is consumer i’s updated subjective probability of maize flour contamination 
after receiving the contamination message c; πi is consumer i’s contamination prior 
before receiving any information; πc is new information received by customers, i.e., the 
25% contamination prevalence that was informed to some of the customers in the sample; 
δi is a measure of consumer i’s confidence in his prior contamination belief; and  (1 −
δi) indicates consumer i’s confidence in the contamination message received.  
Therefore, Bayesian updating rules anticipate that new contamination prevalence 
information would have a greater updating effect when: i) the customer has lower 
confidence in his prior beliefs (larger variance of the prior beliefs distribution); ii) the 
customer has greater confidence in the contamination message received; and iii) the 




beliefs. The last proposition implies that learning that the local contamination prevalence 
is 25% should have a smaller impact on customers whose prior estimate of the 
contamination rate was similar to this level, relative to those whose prior estimate was 
further from this level. Having a contamination prior larger than 25% means that the 
contamination message received would have updated downward the contamination prior, 
and hence led the consumer to a lower updated contamination prevalence. A lower 
updated risk prevalence is not expected to have a positive impact on the decision to buy a 
safer bag of maize flour (if anything, this change should decrease demand for safety-
labeled flour). In contrast, having a contamination prior lower than 25% means that the 
contamination message would have led to a higher updated contamination prevalence; 
and the larger this updating effect—the further away the prior belief from the informed 
25%—the larger the effect on the probability of buying certified maize. 
To test this learning model, three indicator variables were constructed to reflect the 
probability range of customers’ prior contamination beliefs: those with zero 
contamination priors, those with 10% and 20% contamination priors (i.e., below 25%), 
and those with contamination priors above 30%. Balance was checked for the baseline 
variables across those who received the contamination message in each of these groups 
vs the respective comparison groups (see Table A1 in the Appendix). There are several 
significant differences at 1% and 5% levels in the group with priors above 30%, due to 
the small number of observations in this group (10 customers had priors above 30%, 8 of 
which received the contamination message, and 2 did not). Sample characteristics are 




Column 1 in Table 11 shows that receiving the contamination message increases 
the probability of buying certified maize by 38 percentage points (p<0.01) among 
individuals with 10% and 20% contamination priors (i.e., who believe there is a positive 
chance that local shops sell contaminated maize flour but below the informed 
contamination prevalence). Further, customers who had contamination priors above the 
informed contamination rate (i.e., priors equal or above 30%), were also positively and 
significantly affected by the contamination message: their probability of buying certified 
maize is 47 percentage points above those with similar priors who did not receive the 
contamination message (p<0.05).
46
 On the other hand, the contamination message had no 
significant effect on those with zero priors (the omitted category among the priors 
variables in the regression).   
Specification 2 in Table 11 shows essentially the same result. Those customers who 
thought it was impossible for a local store to sell aflatoxin-contaminated maize, when 
faced with the new information that the local contamination prevalence was 25%, did not 
have a higher probability of buying certified flour. A test of joint significance of the 
effect of the contamination message on those with zero priors shows that the effect is not 
significant and close to zero.  
These results are at odds with the Bayesian updating model, under which the 
contamination message would be expected to have the largest (positive) impact on those 
with the lowest subjective prior beliefs of contamination probability. Instead, the 
contamination message had a larger effect on those who were less surprised by the new 
information because they already had relatively high risk perceptions (both those who 
                                                 
46
 An F test was conducted to test the equality of effects for those with priors of 10-20% and those 




had to revise downwards their priors and those who had to revise them upwards but 
starting from a nonzero prior). Customers who had a zero contamination prior should 
have been the most affected by the new information, but they were not. 
 
Table 11: Influence of prior beliefs on contamination prevalence (OLS) 
 
 
One interpretation of these results is that people may be able to give a meaningful 
answer about whether they believe there is any chance that maize in local shops could be 
(1) (2)
Contamination message received 0.0277 0.4054***
(0.049) (0.111)
Child health message received 0.0145 0.0177
(0.046) (0.045)
Contamination prior = 10% and 20% -0.1656
(0.102)
Contamination message X Prior = 10% and 20% 0.3550***
(0.132)
Contamination prior >=30% -0.1066
(0.142)
Contamination message X Prior >=30% 0.4466**
(0.205)
Contamination prior = 0% 0.1614*
(0.096)





Vendor fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 328 328
R-squared 0.357 0.356
Robust standard errors in parentheses





contaminated with aflatoxin, but less able to give a meaningful estimate of the precise 
probability of contamination (since contamination is generally unobservable). For those 
who believe there is some chance of contamination (regardless of the specific subjective 
probability they state), receiving information that 25% of flour is contaminated above the 
regulatory limit leads them to believe that the risk is sufficiently high to warrant purchase 
of labeled flour. On the other hand, those who believe there is zero chance of 
contamination (half of whom had never heard of aflatoxin) may ignore the new 
information about the risk because such information is not credible given their priors that 
aflatoxin is not a threat.  
 





if we define its elements as follows: 
Prob(A|I) = updated subjective probability that maize is contaminated, given that the new 
information is correct. 
Prob(I|A) = subjective probability that new information is correct, given prior subjective 
belief regarding possibility of contamination 
Prob(A) = prior subjective belief that maize may be contaminated 
Prob(I) = subjective belief that the new information is correct 
 
For those with zero priors of aflatoxin contamination, Prob(A) is zero, and hence 
the updated subjective probability of contamination is also zero (Prob(A|I)=0). In other 




(Prob(A)>0), Prob(I|A) is positive. Holding Prob(I) constant, this results in higher 
updated subjective probability of contamination for those with a non-zero prior relative to 
those with a zero prior. 
It should be noted that those customers with positive priors were more likely to be 
aware that aflatoxin exposure is harmful for human health. In fact, all participants with 
positive priors were aware that aflatoxin causes health problems, compared to only 46% 
of participants with zero priors. Although all participants were given information on the 
health impacts of aflatoxin exposure (either through the general health or child health 
messages), this information may have been less credible to those with no prior knowledge 
that aflatoxin is harmful for humans. It was not possible to separate the influence of both 
contamination priors and health risk priors due to the lack of any intersection between 
those with positive priors of contamination probability and those unaware of the health 
risks associated with aflatoxin exposure. 
A model of limited attention (a rational model with information processing costs) is 
also consistent with these results. Under such a model, receiving information about the 
rate of contamination could change behavior by adding salience to an already known 
problem, regardless of whether or how this information updates beliefs. It is also possible 
that information that is closer to prior beliefs has a lower processing cost and hence a 
larger impact on behavior. 
It should be kept in mind that there could be some endogeneity in the 
contamination prior variables biasing the estimated coefficients. This could be the case if 
there were unobservable factors correlated with, for instance, wealth or education and the 




with being better informed and having better comprehension skills and hence having 
higher contamination priors. In such case, the results obtained could be due to a better 
comprehension of the information given, and not to the message itself. These factors, 
together with the fact that the sample of customers who had positive contamination priors 
is very small, imply that these results have to be interpreted with caution and should be 
explored further. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This work shows that information alone can induce people to make an investment 
in order to decrease a health risk, even if the investment is costly. Almost half of the 
customers who participated in this study decided to purchase aflatoxin tested maize at a 
20% price premium. Further, the type of information provided does seem to influence 
behavior. Information on the local prevalence of aflatoxin contamination, which 
exceeded the vast majority of customers’ contamination priors, had the strongest impact 
on demand. This information increased the probability of customers buying the labeled 
flour by between 9 and 11 percentage points. This study demonstrates that combining 
information on the prevalence of a risk with the health consequences of such risk appears 
to be the most effective approach for changing preventive health behavior. 
The results presented differ from those reported by De Groote et al. (2016), which 
show that the WTP for tested labeled maize of participants who received information was 
7% lower and that the WTP of participants who knew that aflatoxins are toxic was 8% 
lower. The authors argue that both information received and prior knowledge did not 
increase the WTP for tested maize—and even reduced WTP for the regular untested 




awareness about a potential contaminant. My results, in contrast, indicate that both 
information and prior knowledge positively influence the decision to purchase certified 
flour. In particular, previous knowledge about aflatoxin increased the probability of 
buying the labeled alternative by around 7 percentage points. This is important because it 
shows that education campaigns—which are a relatively inexpensive policy tool—are 
likely to be effective not only for raising awareness about the risks of aflatoxin exposure, 
but also have the potential to increase demand for safer food. Further, the results imply 
that concentrating such efforts in those areas where current awareness is low could help 
motivate the adoption of preventive health behaviors.  
Existing evidence points to the severely harmful effect that aflatoxin has on 
children’s health, in particular through exposure to contaminated food early in life, which 
is associated with stunted growth. This in turn has negative consequences for the 
development process in poor countries. Therefore, it was of particular interest to assess 
the impact of the provision of information on child health risks related to aflatoxin 
exposure. The study shows that receiving information on child health consequences of 
exposure had an effect that was 18 percentage points larger for customers whose 
households include children, relative to those who don’t. This result shows that public 
health communication strategies might be more effective when they are able to provide 
information that is more relevant for the targeted population.  
Similar to Ifft et al. (2012) and Birol et al. (2015), this study finds that more 
educated consumers have higher willingness to pay for safe food. Customers that had 
completed post-secondary studies had a 20% higher probability of buying the certified 




coincidence with some studies that have not found gender differences in willingness to 
invest in preventive health (Dupas, 2009). Not surprisingly given the large size of the 
price premium, wealthier customers had a higher chance of choosing the certified maize. 
Birol et al. (2015) list several studies that have estimated consumer demand for food 
safety in developed countries, and state that in general these studies have found that 
demand for safer and higher quality food increases with income, education and food 
safety awareness levels. These results coincide with what was found in this study in a 
very different setting.  
This study also finds that a prior belief that contamination is not possible could 
limit the impact of providing risk information. Having positive priors about the 
contamination prevalence increased the effect of the provision of risk prevalence 
information on purchase behavior. A possible explanation is that information that has 
lower processing costs or that is more credible given prior beliefs has a larger impact on 
customers’ purchase decisions. Similar to Ortega et al. (2011)’s suggestion that higher 
subjective risk perceptions could encourage higher willingness to pay for food safety 
information, these beliefs may be associated with greater readiness to process and act on 
information on the rate of contamination, as the possible disutility from not choosing the 
safer option could be higher for those already aware and concerned about the food safety 
problem.  
Most of the literature on the constraints to preventive health investment in 
developing countries has found that information, in particular when it is provided only 
once, has very small effects on demand (Dammert et al., 2014; Dupas, 2009). The high 




information are quite surprising, in particular when compared with the low take-up of 
other preventive health inputs in similar settings and with much smaller price premiums. 
This could be due to the fact that food safety, which is by definition bundled with food 
itself, has specific characteristics that distinguish it from other preventive health products. 
For example, choosing a safety-labeled package of food instead of a regular untested one 
does not require any additional effort and cooking one or the other is an identical activity. 
In contrast, purchasing and using an insecticide-treated bed net or a water-purification 
technology require large changes to routine activities and additional effort and time. Also, 
food safety can sometimes be—or be perceived as—correlated with taste, a food attribute 
that is very much valued and can only be assessed after purchase. For instance, in this 
study, 36% of customers who knew what aflatoxin is had the incorrect belief that 
contaminated flour must taste poorly. However, only 7% of customers who bought the 
certified maize said they did so because they believed it might taste better, so it does not 
seem to be an important reason to explain the purchase behavior observed.  
Some caveats of the results presented in this study should be noted. Perhaps most 
importantly, consumers received health and prevalence information immediately prior to 
making a purchase decision. The salience of this information was thus at its peak, leading 
to maximum impact. It is likely that the impact of this information on purchase decisions 
would fade over time. On a related note, as has been noted in the literature, one time 
purchases can differ from recurrent purchase behavior, especially when a large price 
premium is involved. Future studies should analyze the behavior of demand over longer 
periods of time. In the case of maize flour that is aflatoxin tested, this would require 




Second, the fact that consumers were not sure if they would be able to purchase 
safer certified maize again in the future could have made them choose the regular option 
because a sole purchase of safe maize would have an extremely marginal effect on their 
health. Further, given that the label did not have a governmental or other well-known 
identification, customers could have not trusted the label. On the other hand, the same 
fact that consumers did not know if they would be able to purchase the certified option 
again could have made them curious to try something that might not be available in the 
future. In this latter case, the decision to purchase certified would not be driven by health 
reasons, but rather by curiosity to try something new. As noted by Ifft et al. (2012), any 
field experiment conducted in a single period of time that aims to test the willingness to 
pay for a new product is subject to the influence of both curiosity and skepticism for the 





Table A.1: P-values of tests of difference in means by message assignment, relative to comparison group 
 
 
Child Message (vs Gral) 
HHs with children











Female (%) 0.02** 0.33 0.93 0.49 0.31
Age (# years) 0.85 0.46 0.10 0.03** 0.03**
There are children in HH (%) - - 0.30 0.73 0.96
Completed primary school (%) 0.44 0.21 0.73 0.91 0.29
Completed secondary school (%) 0.83 0.27 0.91 0.79 0.00***
Completed post secondary school (%) 0.87 0.08* 0.18 0.83 0.007***
HH grows maize (%) 0.55 0.94 0.52 0.42 0.00***
Wealth score 0.37 0.26 0.71 0.46 0.28
Knowledge score 0.63 0.13 0.48 0.89 0.30
n 111 66 134 29 8
The comparison group is shown between brackets in each column title. Given the experiment design, the comparison group for the child health message is the general health message,
 irrespective of receiving the contamination message. The comparison group for the contamination message is not receiving this message, irrespective of receiving  either the child
 health or general health messages. 
(1) P-values are from separate linear regressions of each variable on the child message interacted with having children in the HH, the contamination message and vendor dummies.
(2) P-values are from separate linear regressions of each variable on the contamination message interacted with the different ranges of priors, the child message and vendor dummies.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Influence of having children in the HH on the 
effect of the child health message (1)





Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
The goal of this dissertation was to analyze the response of food value chain 
actors when faced with otherwise unobservable food safety and quality information in 
real market settings in a developing country. Given that food safety comprises several 
unobservable or imperfectly observable characteristics, the absence of testing 
technologies, certification schemes and information labels in these settings leads to 
uninformed choices that can have negative health consequences for consumers. The 
two field experiments conducted in Kenya tested if traders and customers’ informed 
choices reflect willingness to pay a premium for safer and higher quality food, and if 
the provision of different types of information could have a differential impact on 
their demand for this type of food.  
The results show that traders and consumers in this context were willing to 
purchase food labeled as safer and higher-quality for a premium, confirming that the 
observability of moisture content and aflatoxin contamination is limited. Information 
on both maize moisture content and aflatoxin contamination significantly affected 
traders’ willingness to pay, with the impact of aflatoxin contamination labeling being 
over twice as large. A possible explanation suggested for this—although one 
impossible to either prove or refute given the available data—is that traders might be 
able to sell this safer maize to customers with whom they have built trust through 
repeated transactions. When it comes to consumers, almost half of the customers in 
the experiment were willing to buy certified maize flour at a 20% price premium over 
regular untested flour, demonstrating that on average there is a high level of concern 
about aflatoxin-contaminated maize.  
Further, the consumers experiment provided evidence that lack of information 
constrains investment in safer food, which can be considered a preventive health 
behavior. It also showed that the impact of health messaging on purchase of tested 
maize varies significantly depending both on the specific content of the message, and 
on the characteristics and prior beliefs of consumers. This coincides with several 
studies in the economics literature that have found that information can have large 




matter. Information on the local prevalence of aflatoxin contamination, which 
exceeded the vast majority of customers’ contamination priors, had the strongest 
impact on demand. Similar to what studies have found in developed country settings, 
demand for safer maize increased with income, education and food safety awareness. 
What is more, having non-zero priors about the probability of contamination 
increased the effect of the provision of prevalence information on purchase behavior, 
contradicting a learning model that predicts that more unexpected information should 
have larger updating effects. Finally, the results showed that information that is more 
relevant for the targeted population, specifically the impact on child health for 
customers whose households include children, may be more successful at achieving 
the expected change in preventive health behavior. 
Increasing the observability of food safety and quality in the context studied is 
not an easy task. Improving information on moisture content in informal maize 
markets is probably the most feasible mechanism to strengthen the price-quality 
relationship within these markets given that moisture testing technology is 
inexpensive and it could reach traders through agricultural extension services or 
through a moisture meter rental scheme. However, testing and labeling for aflatoxin 
at informal markets do not seem viable mainly due to the current high cost of testing, 
in particular given the small scale that characterize transactions in these markets. In 
the case of processed maize flour, making aflatoxin-tested and certified flour 
available for consumers in Kenya could be implemented given that most of the maize 
flour is processed by a small number of large millers. Still, creating a reliable and 
consistent supply of certified safe maize flour would require a comprehensive 
approach to the problem, including establishment of a credible public or third-party 
verification entity, providing access to technologies that help reduce contamination at 
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